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John Shawcross, John Milton: The Self and the
World (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
1993). Pp.358. $35.00.
Reviewed by Anna Battigelli
State University of New York, Plattsburgh
In A Writer's Diary, Virginia Woolf records being struck by
the difference between Paradise Lost and any other poem; that
difference, she wrote, lies in its "sublime aloofness and
impersonality of...emotion." She concludes her entry by
admiring the beauty of Milton's poetry, conceding "that even
Shakespeare after this would seem a little troubled, personal,
hot and imperfect." Woolf's comments highlight the formida
ble task of reconstructing a Miltonic "self: many readers of his
sublime poetry do not particularly want a personalized self
behind the poetry; like Charles Lamb, these cherish the image
of a vatic poet for whom "Lycidas" arrived complete, mapping
out the trajectory of his poetic career. John T. Shawcross's
recent biography, John Milton: The Self and the World, offers a
few jolts for such readers, beginning with the claim that "the
359
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trend of this biography is psychological—Milton as anal
personality, Milton conditioned by oedipal influences, and
Milton as one caught in conflict between his self and his world"
(5). The Jungian and Lacanian psychological study that follows
may, at times, strike some as indelicate, but it cannot be
dismissed. Shawcross examines the poet, the historian, the
religious and political polemicist, and, most importantly, the
son, identifying the psychological substructs at work within
Milton's mind, informing his work. The analysis is learned and
original, providing a valuable reconstruction of the elusive
Miltonic "self."
At the heart of Shawcross's analysis is a Miltonically revised
oedipal struggle first fully articulated in "Ad Patrem" (1638), a
key poem in this account of Milton's life. For Shawcross,
Milton reached the decision to become a poet hesitantly, some
months after his mother's death on April 3, 1637. Milton's
mother's death, argues Shawcross, allowed Milton a fuller
individuation from his father, an individuation in which his
decision to become a poet plays a defining role. The relation
ship between father and son suggested in "Ad Patrem" is not
merely one of "calm acceptance of the father, it is a rejection
too. It ushers in a new world for its author, as much as the
fresh woods and pastures new. And it plays upon the feminine
within the father, who too had pursued the arts. The decision
to be a poet and the tardy moving, not into the ministry, not
into the world of business or government, and not into family
life, but into the uncertain poetic world, must have been a blow
to Milton Senior" (189). Complicating this oedipal struggle is
Milton's concept of God as Father, which revises the standard
Freudian oedipal complex; "for Milton, the emulation [of the
father] does not involve envy and overdoing, but praise and
imitation" (20). Thus, the closing lines of "Ad Patrem," in
which Milton, the son, hopes his poem might preserve both his
praise for his father and his father's name, find a suggestive
parallel in "God the Father, who in his manifestation through
the Son is constant example to future generations" (87).
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Emulation of the father is sublimated in the theological doctrine
of subordinationism.
The sublimation allowed by subordinationism informs
Shawcross's readings of the major poems and prose. Thus,
Milton's claim in Of Education, that "the end of learning is to
repair the ruins of our first parents," fulfills a duty to the
Father. In Paradise Lost we see "a residue of Milton's father's
rebelliousness against his [Catholic] grandfather in Satan's
rebellion against God, and its sublimation in his loving
accedence to his father in the Son's functioning as surrogate for
the Father" (248). In a variation on this theme, Samson is
unable to obey God the Father until he dismisses the advice of
his father, Manoa.
Central to the doctrine of subordination is hierarchy, and
the famous lines in Book IV of Paradise Lost describing Adam
and Eve reveal a chiasmically ordered and thus necessary union
even at they imply a hierarchy: "For contemplation bee and
valour formd, / For softness shee and sweet attractive Grace."
Just as Christ holds a subordinate, though not inferior, role to
God, Eve holds a subordinate, though not inferior, role to
Adam. It would be difficult to argue with Shawcross here.
Some will argue, however, with his claim that Milton was not
a radical because "his psychological being [was] built upon
acceptance of, emulation of, and accommodation to the
father/God rather than upon rebelliousness" (237). Although
many have acknowledged, as Shawcross does, the difficulty of
aligning Milton with any specific religious sect or political
ideology, the vexed term "radical" suits Milton's religious and
political vision, even if psychologically he was not a rebellious
son.
Some of Shawcross's claims (for example, that Milton's
youthful friendship with Charles Diodati was homoerotic) seem
tenuous. But the careful readings, the precise chronologies, and
the learned attention to symbol from etymology to archetype
make this biographical account of Milton one that scholars will
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have to both wrestle with and, for the most part, accede to,
however reluctantly, for a long time to come.

Gale H. Carrithers, Jr., and James D. Hardy, Jr.,
Milton and the Hermeneutic Journey (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1994). Pp. xii +
256. $35.00.
Reviewed by Robert Entzminger
Rhodes College
For the last decade or more, the trend in Milton studies as
in most areas of literary criticism has been to provide readings
"against the grain," to examine texts not in terms of what they
represent as focal, but rather in terms of those issues they
attempt to suppress, elide, or banish to the margins. The
insights yielded by attending to questions of gender, politics,
and psychic conflict, to cite prominent examples, have been
provocative and invigorating. While neither unconversant with
nor unsympathetic to these approaches. Gale Carrithers and
James Hardy, professors of English and of history respectively,
demonstrate the continuing vitality of the more traditional
critical project, that of accepting the text on its own terms, of
reading with the grain. Rather than submitting Milton's poetry
to a relentless interrogation designed to expose what it would
prefer to veil, they engage it in a subtle and open-ended
dialogue, paying Milton the compliment of taking his theology
seriously even as they reread it in the light of poststructuralist
hermeneutics, principally as advanced in the writings of Paul
Ricoeur and Hans Georg Gadamer.
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The theological context in which the authors place Milton
is the broad one of Augustinian Christianity, particularly in its
stress on divine grace and love, and its recuperation by
seventeenth-century Protestants (7);
and they locate its
congruence with late twentieth-century hermeneutics in the
emphasis both place upon understanding as a process of dialectic
between faith and knowledge, part and whole, past and present,
time and eternity (19). The project thus is deliberately one of
synthesis, relying upon a unifying perspective or trope, and in
its scope and ambitions recalls such magisterial works of Milton
scholarship as Mary Ann Radzinowicz's Toward Samson
Agonistes (Princeton, 1978) and Louis L. Martz's Poet of Exile
(Yale, 1980). Such an undertaking necessarily entails the
revisiting of territory that Milton scholars, not to mention
historians and theologians, will find familiar. The titles of
chapters two through five, the ones focusing on Paradise Lost,
represent something of a survey of the most prominent
landmarks in the Miltonic intellectual landscape; "The Fallen
Understanding," "The Dynamics of Nature and History,"
"Movement and Dynamism," "Knowing and Naming: Adam,
Eve, and Bard." Moreover, in organizing their treatment of
these topics the authors deploy the Neoplatonic scale of being
as it was codified for modern scholars in Arthur O. Lovejoy's
The Great Chain of Being (Harvard, 1936). The debts to
previous scholarship as a consequence are large, and the authors
are scrupulous in acknowledging them, gracious in registering
occasional disagreement.
The familiarity of the topics and the organizational paradigm
notwithstanding, Carrithers and Hardy offer neither a rehearsal
of theological commonplaces nor a programmatic application of
contemporaneous ideas in a reductive attempt to "explain" the
text. What they do provide are subtle descriptions of important
episodes and topics, especially those in which hermeneutic
issues are at stake: the Satanic embrace of power rather than
love, the paradoxes of the felix culpa and of human freedom
within providential certitude, the differences between Adam and
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Eve. In each of these as well as the other subjects they address,
the authors resist schematic conclusions or ingenious resolutions
of paradox, stressing instead the "radical ambiguity" (27) such
moments disclose, their relation to the hermeneutic journey
toward an ever-fuller understanding of divine will, love, and
grace. The book's primary strength thus lies not so much in
providing new interpretations of individual passages as in its
effort to register the full complexity of the poetry as a whole
through re-ambiguating precisely those issues that have seemed
most settled. Thus the ironies of Adam's statement of the
Fortunate Fall in Book 12, for instance, are recovered in the
authors insistence that the culpa is at once felix and infelix, no
less a tragedy from a human perspective for our recognition
that it will ultimately be revised as a divine coniedy (80-92).
Paradise Lost becomes then not a monument to dead ideas, "but
the record of the struggle with the paradoxes and ambiguities
that beset human existence, what the authors refer to as
"hermeneutic middleness" (21). Only in their comparison of
Adam and Eve do they relax their resistance to what they call
"determinate" readings (11), attempting to resolve one of the
poem's most complex issues simply by declaring a winner:
"The striking qualitative disparity between the dream visions of
Adam and Eve indicates to us that Milton saw a disparity in the
capacities of the two, and that Eve's was the greater" (119).
The very occasional lapses into determinacy aside, some
readers will be surprised, and perhaps distressed, that not even
in the first chapter, in which the procedures and assumptions
are set forth, is there a full exposition of the hermeneutic
theories being invoked, and that despite the use of the word
"journey" in the book's title, the organization is neither
chronological nor teleological. Faithful to the implications of
their approach, the authors avoid abstract explanations,
adopting a style that is often refreshingly colloquial though
sometimes over-qualified, and themselves enact "hermeneutic
middleness" by addressing first Paradise Lost before turning in
successive chapters to the 1645 Poems and finally to the last
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works. Their title notwithstanding, they are less interested in
charting a development in the poems than in describing the
hermeneutic experience as it occurs in each of the three
volumes of poetry Milton published. Middles, beginnings, and
endings comment upon and illuminate one another, but not in
a strictly linear fashion.
The final chapter, on Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes,
returns to the question of love and power that the authors had
first raised with regard to Satan in chapter two, with the
emphasis in Paradise Regained of course being on the reaffirma
tion of love, the resistance to the temptations of power.
Samson Agonistes, however, becomes a more problematic text
from this perspective. Departing from the critical consensus in
their stress upon the tragedy's difference from Milton's other
works, Carrithers and Hardy find its protagonist plunged into
the confusions and frustrations of human existence without the
benefit of Christian revelation. In this reading it becomes a
darker work, concluding Milton's career on a note of decidedly
limited affirmation.
Valuable as the discussions of the major poems are, the most
successful chapter, the one that uses the hermeneutic approach
to best effect, is chapter six, "Youth to Maturity: Journey's
Early Perils." Discussing the volume of poems Milton pub
lished in 1645 and, with revisions, in 1673, the authors
demonstrate how the individual poems engage in a rich and
subtle dialogue with one another, revealing individually and
collectively Milton's ongoing concern with the hermeneutic
issues his theology raises. "Milton's early journey," assert
Carrithers and Hardy, "was not a separate road but a stage on
the same hermeneutic loop" (152), the record of "a hermeneutic
exploration toward theodicy as love and self-commitment in
history" (179).
The authors make a persuasive case for hermeneutics as a
defining trope in all of Milton's poetry, but perhaps their more
significant achievement is to illustrate that the theoretical
questions posed by late twentieth-century criticism are not

366

mo-mo

necessarily incompatible with a broadly sympathetic reading of
texts, even those from the seventeenth century that insist upon
foregrounding theological issues. And in accepting "hermeneutic middleness" as the defining quality of the critical enterprise,
Carrithers and Hardy have moved Milton scholarship a step
further along in its journey.
%

Stanley "Wells, Gary Taylor, John Jowett, and
"William Montgomery, eds.. The Oxford Shakespeare:
Histories (I), Comedies (II), and Tragedies (III)
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987; rpt. 1994).
3 volumes, ill. Paper, $35.85 ($11.95 each).
Reviewed by Kenneth S. Rothwell
University of Vermont
The extraordinary 1986 Clarendon Press one-volume William
Shakespeare: The Complete Works has now been made more
generally available for readers in these three handsomely printed
paperbacks. Its introduction by Stanley Wells sums up the
dilemma confronting the modern editor: "should he offer his
readers a text which is as close as possible to what Shakespeare
originally wrote, or should he aim to formulate a text
presenting the play as it appeared when performed by the
company of which Shakespeare was a principal shareholder" (I,
xxix)? In taking the latter road, the one less traveled, the
Oxford editors privilege theatrical over literary values. That
decision avoids some but not all of the quandaries raised by the
multiple textual variations between the quartos printed in the
bard's lifetime (1564-1616) and the 36 plays of the 1623 Folio,
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posthumously published by fellow shareholders, John Heminges
and Henry Condell.
In this current edition, the quarto texts have been viewed as
drafts for the more disciplined Folio theatrical versions. The
editors even go so far as to print both the 1608 quarto version.
The History of King Lear, and the 1623 Folio, The Tragedy of
King Lear, in the radical belief that the former represented the
play Shakespeare "first conceived" (m, 1233), and that the latter
embodied a text possibly dictated by "theatrical exigencies" or
authorial "dissatisfaction" (m, 1271). Typically, past editors,
assuming that variants stemmed from printing house errors,
conflated the two King Lears to achieve a single, synthetic text.
This bold Oxford approach becomes a wakeup call that tugs
editing policies into the late twentieth century. Not that
innovation doesn't raise hackles and invite brickbats, as when
Gary Taylor's claim of a few years ago that he'd discovered a
lost Shakespearean poem, "Shall I die.'" ("A Song," I, 405), set
off an avalanche of choleric letters to editors. Likewise, in these
three volumes there's something heretical to anger almost
everyone: the substitution of "Sir John Oldcastle" for "Sir John
Falstaff"; the omission of Hamlet's 1604 quarto soliloquy,
"How all occasions do inform against me" (relegated, I hasten
to add, to the "additional passages" section); or the insistence on
the long-winded 1600 quarto title. The Comical History of the
Merchant of Venice, or Otherwise Called the Jew of Venice.
In many respects these volumes are user-friendly, yet in
other ways, curiously unfriendly.
Spellings have been
consistently modernized, masterful brief introductions to the
individual plays added, but annotations for baffled readers made
more or less inaccessible. In volume two's Troilus and Cressida,
for example, the Folio "Princes Oigillous" has been simplified
to "princes orgulous" (If 749, Pro. 2), well and good. However,
those readers unlucky enough not to know the meaning of
"orgulous" need to track down the glossary in a different
volume (the third). For full editorial apparatus, truly dedicated
scholars must hasten hence to the library to ferret out the
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conjunctive but separately published Textual Companion,
Complete Works: Original Spelling Edition (New York: Oxford,
1987), and Stanley Wells's Re-editing Shakespeare for the Modem
Reader (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).
Without these companion volumes at hand, the reader may
be unaware of silent editorial interventions in matters of
punctuation and spelling. Macbeth's "Making the Greene one.
Red" (Folio) loses the comma in the Oxford "Making the green
one red" (HI Mac. 2.2.61). The 1604 quarto reading seems to
drive Hamlet's "O God, O God, / How weary, stale, flat" (III
Ham. 1.2.132), rather than the more emphatic Folio version, "O
God, O God! / How weary, stale, flat." At the same time,
quarto "wary" gets updated to "weary." Nitpicking perhaps,
but such interventions may nudge an actor toward a pre
determined idiolect. Again, the quarto acts as the yardstick for
correcting Shakespeare's Folio syntax. As predicate for "weary,
stale, flat and unprofitable" an agreeable "seem" (III Ham.
1.2.134), replaces the Folio's disagreeable "seemes." To make
matters even more complicated, however (and at this point a
call for headache powders is justified), in the quarto "seem" is
actually spelled "seeme" (see The Three-Text Hamlet, ed. Paul
Bertram and Bernice Kliman [New York: AMS Press, 1991],
221). Multiplied by hundreds these examples would furnish
some insight into the heroic labor behind the finished work.
The Oxford editors have democratically invited, indeed
challenged, all of us to participate with them in deciding how
Shakespeare's plays emerged in the Elizabethan playhouses, not
how they looked in his lost manuscripts. Consequently, we are
both liberated and enslaved—liberated from the oppressive myth
of the Holy Grail of the ideal text, but enslaved to a Tantalusian quest of endlessly receding possibilities. Will future
Shakespeare editions in the twenty-first century follow this trailblazing path, or again take the road more travelled?
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Carlo Goldoni, The Holiday Trilogy.
Three
Comedies. Translated with a Note by Anthony
Oldcorn; introduction by Franco Fido (New York:
Marsilio, 1992). Pp. xlv + 303. $28.00.
Reviewed by Jackson I. Cope
University of Southern California (Emeritus)
The once dominant voice of the eighteenth-century theater
popularly survives only in the dubious adjective "Metastasian";
his humbler coeval on the Italian stage remains there still, as
Carlo Goldoni's comedies continue a vibrant life in countless
Italian and other continental productions of our time, brilliant
season after season, while the shelves of critical and historical
commentary expand exponentially at a rate surpassed only by
Dante and Boccaccio among the ma^iori of Italian literature.
Indeed, the most recent addition to the critical shelf is a thick
volume on the eminent productions of Goldoni's comedies by
twentieth-century directors (Paolo Bosisio's II teatro di Goldoni
suite scene italiene del Novecento). Yet this greatest playwright
of the eighteenth-century is a closed book to most of even the
most literate English and American readers. If they have read
Goldoni in the few translations of scattered plays, they have
been puzzled by his continental and contemporary reputation;
if they have seen one of his comedies mounted in production,
they have been extraordinarily surprised by serendipity. It has
been this way from the first.
In the eighteenth century, Goldoni's name evoked the
admiring tribute of Voltaire as the prolific painter of nature.
Prolific Goldoni was, leaving some nearly two hundred
dramatic pieces to be published during and after his lifetime,
including over one hundred full-length comedies in both verse
and prose, in Italian, Venetian, and French—the last language
adopted after Goldoni moved from his native Venice to become
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the major writer collaborating with the Comedie Italienne.
Admired, read, and staged across the European continent in his
own time, Goldoni's works went virtually unrecognized in
England. One cause was the circumstance that Goldoni, like
Voltaire, had adapted Richardson's Pamela for the stage; the
English came to know it in a literal language-text translation of
what was, even at its Italian best, a tepid version of their own
favorite epistolary novel. It was a phenomenon that did not
encourage further English translations of the more characteristic
comedies rooted in northern Italian social settings. Paradoxi
cally, La buona figliuola, Goldoni's adaptation of his own prose
comedy on Pamela, became the most popular of Italian
operettas in England throughout the century, beginning with its
Haymarket premier in 1766—but like the two dozen other
Goldonian libretti produced and translated in England, La
buona figliuola became associated with the composer (in this
instance, Niccolo Piccini), rather than with its creator Goldoni
(see my "Goldoni's England and England's Goldoni," Modem
Language Notes 110 [1995]).
William Dean Howells may be said to have discovered
Goldoni for Americans by way of the critical panegyrics that
resulted from his youthful consular residency in Venice
throughout the Civil War and his abiding appreciation of the
city and its culture. Vernon Lee's Studies of the Eighteenth
Century in Italy served a similar function in England not much
later, and H. C. Chatfield-Taylor's biography of Goldoni
written in English in 1913 was the most thorough at the time,
and remains a valuable quarry. Even so, neither in America
nor in England were there more than scattered translation
attempts, usually partial and uniformly uninformed from both
literary and theatrical standpoints. Eleanora Duse's English
tour in 1894 staged a mangled version of La locandiera, which
found public print, but it was not until 1922 that Clifford Bax
and the Far)eons combined to issue a collection of four stilted
versions ("You may be able to do whatever you please in this
village, but you can do nothing at all in my matrimonial
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affairs," etc.). Two of these versions were reissued in 1961
along with a respectable rendition of I rusteghi as a little
anthology with which Cambridge University Press apparently
hoped to corner a small market. This commercial illusion was
dispelled by the issue in the widely distributed "Penguin
Classics" of four plays by Goldoni in the translations of
Frederick Davies. These represent only half of Davies's
versions of Goldoni, the others being issued by "Heinemann
Educational" carrying photos of the productions staged at
Pensby County Secondary School for Boys, Heswall, Cheshire.
These pseudo-translations manage to be simultaneously tui^id
and curtailed. This sorry roster of failure was relieved only by
Edward Dent's very effective 1928 Servant of Two Masters,
produced at Cambridge with a young Michael Redgrave as the
innamorato; that Dent's version was not produced more
frequently was probably owing to the international success of
Strehler's perennial productions of this earliest Goldonian
masterpiece, with its commedia dell'arte aura of breakneck farce.
I have recited this depressing history of anglophonic
ignorance to emphasize the significance of Anthony Oldcorn's
achievement in finally giving us a text that transports the
Venetian scene to the ear and psyche of an English-speaking
audience. These are dramatic translations in every sense, the
first that provide us a view of Goldoni at the height of his
maturity, when he takes his own most complex view of the
human cost that paid for the great construction of that society
which was Venice before Napoleon.
Professor Oldcorn has translated, under the innocuous rubric
of "the Holiday Trilogy," a trio of plays: "Off to the Country"
[Le smanie per la villeggiatural, "Adventures in the Country" [£e
awenture delta villeggiatura\, and "Back from the Country" [//
ritomo dalla villeggiatura]. The plays originally were produced
in series, each production being separated from the other parts
of the sequence by only a few evenings during the Venetian
season of 1761. When they were published for the first time in
a volume of the luxurious collected edition of his comedies a
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dozen years later, Goldoni said in an introduction that "they
were composed in such a way that each of them can stand on
its own, while all three fit together perfectly." The tri-part plot
can be summed up simply; Goldoni uses the Venetian custom
of removing to the mainland country villas for long vacations
that stretched through the late autumn months to focus the
affected punctilios of style, the extravagant potlatch rituals of
entertainment, the gambling mania at the ubiquitous card tables
and in the brokered marriage contracts, which both maintained
and revealed the precariousness of Venice's rigid class system.
Indeed, so clear is his focus, that Goldoni nominally screens his
critique by transporting Venetian habits to Livorno and its
environs. But these are plays as radically Venetian as any of
those Goldoni wrote in the dialect of his native city. In a
hubbub of jealous bickering about rival wardrobes, travel
seating arrangements, and devil-may-care borrowing for this
expensive vacationing, two families and their guests and
hangers-on prepare to depart for the country. They are, not
unexpectedly, intertwined through the marital prospects of a
young woman in each group. The second play reveals their
behavior once they have arrived in the country setting, where
they are joined by two new groups of marital aspirants, a
fatuous and wealthy old dowager and her young mercenary
suitor, and a nubile pair of innocents being drawn into marriage
by an equally mercenary guardian. These, though, serve to set
into context the crossed loves of Giacinta, the young woman
who, rashly betrothed to one innamorato, finds in the fresh
perspective offered by the country freedoms that she is in love
with another. The final play transports the entire group back
to the city where Giacinta's sense of reputation and duty to
social expectations interact with the financial disasters that the
"villeggiatura" has brought down on all parties, leading her to
embrace with bitter clarity a respectable, and inevitably
unhappy marriage to Leonardo, the man she does not love.
Strehler's near-legendary Piccolo Teatro group from Milan
in 1954 produced the first modern production of the whole by
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trimming the trilogy to the length of two plays condensed into
less than four hours of playing time; the production achieved
great success not only in Italian, but in French and German
versions later performed by Strehler's company. The result was
an anachronistic Chekhovian affect; Oldcorn includes Strehler's
account of this production and his own strictures upon it in an
appendix. He also includes the director Mike Alfreds's account
of a British National Theatre production in London during
1987-88 which admittedly adapted Strehler's Chekhovian focus
and which consumed nearly five hours of playing time; this text
was never published. In this same year, the first play of the
trilogy in an early draft of Professor Oldcorn's translation was
produced in Utah in conjunction with the annual professional
congress of the American Association of Teachers of Italian.
Oldcorn's Holiday Trilogy is distinguished from the Strehler
and Alfred versions in presenting a full, uncut and unembellished translation of Goldoni's text; nothing has been altered
but the Italian notation of a new scene at each entrance or exit.
The result is a remarkably producible text that faithfully reflects
the remarks in the "translator's note." A Venetian that has
always been less dialect than language was Goldoni's native
speech, at a time when "Italian" was in many respects a literary
artifact based in the Tuscan tradition that was the inheritance
from Dante, an artifact related only by lai^e overlap with the
lingua franca that served as a common communication medium
to speakers of the varied peninsular dialects. Italian was a
language created by books and elaborated through the
Renaissance and Baroque epochs of rhetorical self-consciousness
in display. Yet Goldoni was, in a now famous phrase of the
great philologist Gianfranco Folena, "the least literary and least
grammatical of Italian authors." This was meant as admiring
homage to Goldoni's style, homage less gnomically stated by
Oldcorn when he says that Goldoni's "plays represent the most
successful invention of a nonacademic Italian language since
Dante...the Italian his characters speak is more in the nature of
an ideal koine, a conventional theatrical language...than a
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realistic transcription of localized speech" (xlii). Goldoni's style
is plain because much of the dramatic impact is communicated
by what is not quite spoken—the suppressed, the implied, the
half-articulated—in such a style of dramatic interchange there is
no room for the anachronistic, for the not always resisted
temptation in dealing with eighteenth-century texts "to translate
into a stylized, fastidious, foppish, cocked-little-finger type of
English, a medium that...invites the reader to take a superior
ironical distance from the characters as a group" (xli). Oldcorn
has, I think with affective success of a high order, met his stated
aim; "the target language of the translation ... is our fin de
siecle standard nonvulgar American English." His characters,
who are Goldoni's, converse with us as they were intended to
do. Presumably my judgment is shared, as Oldcorn's prepublication version was given a Kayden prize for translation
awarded by the University of Colorado.
These, as I said, are producible texts, and I would be
surprised if they did not encourage some experimental
productions of this fresh English Goldoni. But for most of the
anglophone audience this must remain an opportunity to
become acquainted with the mature Goldoni as readers. Franco
Fido, the Venetian-born critic who for several decades has
interpreted Goldoni and eighteenth-century Italian drama from
Brown, and now Harvard University, has written an introduc
tory essay for this edition that is aimed to set Goldoni's trilogy
in its contemporary context and to point to some important
guideposts to reading through a condensed presentation of his
own earlier critiques of theater and theme (see my "Franco
Fido's stiidi goldoniani: A Modern Cicerone Maps the Corpus,"
Italica 64 [1987]).
Fido reminds us that Goldoni's prolific output for the
Medebach troupe at the Sant'Angelo theater in Venice between
1748 and 1753 was successful in accomplishing a recognizable
theatrical revolution that came to be known as Goldoni's
riforma. This reformed comedy gradually weaned the actors
and audience from the rigid roles of the commedia dell'arte
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masked types, playing out tired combinations of farce and
romance from sketchy scenarios with a hybrid form of
improvisation and moveable set speeches serviceable for a
number of generic situations. In their place, Goldoni offered
commedie premeditate, plays, as Fido says, "entirely written
down by the author and committed to memory by the actors,
dialogue by dialogue, speech by speech . . . stocked with
characters taken from the everyday life of Venice: merchants
and housewives, middle-class young people of both sexes,
gondoliers, and the like" (x). But the reform of the theater was
intimately entangled with Goldoni's optimistic vision of a
reform of society. Goldoni soon found himself challenged by
the rival, and more traditional Pietro Chiari who took
Goldoni's place as playwright for the Sant'Angelo theater.
Goldoni moved to another company and another theater where
he engaged in a number of experiments, returning finally to
realism that characterized his early Venetian plays. But by the
time he came to write the villeggiatura trilogy, "he sees the
middle-class characters of his final comedies as victims of a crisis
in values: the older generation too narrow-minded and
insular...and the young men and women over-frivolous,
imprudent, and headstrong" (xi). In brief, Fido argues that the
play reveals the dilemma of these ordinary Venetians when
their "privacy," their insulation that is one positive aspect of
insularity, is sacrificed to emulation of the looser high-society
style of the patrician upper classes, with their ruinous gambling
mania at the ridotti, their conversazioni that invite dangerous
liaisons, with their cultivation of cicisbei, those gigolos whom
society, and husbands, engaged in their own affairs, rationalized
as a necessary convenience. Fido, providing a sketch of the
contemporary attitudes toward woman in Venetian society,
makes a feminist reading that finds Giacinta rejecting love not
for duty—as in the love vs. honor dilemmas of Heroic drama—
but from a strong self-image of her personal and social
integration: "Forsaken by the father, the traditional middle-class
merchant values are salvaged by the daughter, who attempts to
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assert her intelligence and independence from inside the system
they stand for" (xxxiii). Such a rough summary does not
pretend to do justice to Fido's essay, although even in fully
developed form it is intended as no more than a stimulus to the
new readers' curiosity about the plays and their contexts. For
instance, they might be stimulated to discover that "privacy"
was precarious in Goldoni's Venice, a city whose walls were
ornamented with lion heads into whose jaws one could
surreptitiously drop denunciations of one's neighbor for the
security police; where every campiello, every little open piazza,
had its local spies at work, and where Casanova served as a
government spy and Goldoni was in the files of the denounced.
In Goldoni's country trilogy, every move seems to be observed:
Giacinta's aunt smugly indicates that she knows the young
woman's secret love; the servants report every gesture of
symbolic body language as the vacationing groups dine together;
Guglielmo's "private" encounter with Giacinta is invaded by his
rival Leonardo; and the latter escapes the creditors who wait in
his antechambers only momentarily by employing a secret
door. In another place ("Goldoni's Secrets," Theatre Survey 31
[1990]), I have suggested that the first play is a farce with all the
dizzying incremental speed of II servitore di due padroni, focused
upon the problems and vacillations of Leonardo; that Le
avventure is a comedy of manners focused by the hyperbolic
ethical punctilios of Guglielmo; and that II ritomo dalla
villeggiatura is in an open-ended tradition of anti-Plautine comic
structure peculiar to Italian drama. This suggestion is but a
straw in the fresh critical wind that has swept new life in a new
language into Goldoni's trilogy, with which Professor Oldcorn
has gifted his English-speaking fellows.
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Thomas Jemielity, Satire and the Hebrew Prophets
(Louisville: "Westminster/John Rnox Press, 1992).
Pp.256. $17.99.
Reviewed by Mark S. Lussier
Arizona State University
This relatively small but intriguing and thorough study
seeks, in the author's words, to "examine systematically the
connection between prophecy and satire in a way that neither
biblical nor literary scholarship has yet pursued it, namely by
considering both in their shared status as "forms or expressions
of critical discourse" (11, 15). Drawing on Northrop Frye's
categories from The Anatomy of Criticism, as well as a wide
range of critical assessments of satire and theories of satire,
Thomas Jemielity offers a comparative consideration capable of
altering any reading of the classical Hebrew prophets and
eighteenth-century practitioners of satiric literature. The text
is written with an eye for detailed confluence and a sensitivity
to categorical departures, and the insights that emerge success
fully extend Jemielity's previous publications on this matter and
realize his aim to broaden the perspective of both "biblical
scholars who are interested in applying literary criteria and
paradigms to the biblical text" and "scholars of satire [concerned
with] expanding an awareness of the origins and evolution of
satire" (16, 17).
In its opening section (chapters 1-3), termed "The Message,"
the text begins its anatomy by assessing the degree to which
both prophecy and satire deploy a rhetoric of shame to critiqueempowered cultural institutions and individuals. The text
uncovers extensive links between the classical Greek and Roman
satirists and the classical Hebrew prophets, where ridicule,
humiliation and curse are articulated in a quasi-legal language to
create a sense of cultural shame: "Prophecy and satire
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deliberately equate suffering and its attendant disgrace with
punishment. They announce, then, a form of justice, even as
revenge" (40). Having established this commonality in a wide
range of classical prophets and satirists, Jemielity broadens the
applicability of these categories by exploring works by Pope,
Dryden, and Johnson.
The second chapter discusses the mixed generic states of
prophecy and satire, where "the form and subject matter of
prophecy and satire provide thus another significant likeness
between them" (51). Thus, the text becomes a mise en abyme,
where form mirrors content:
"The weird, grotesque,
misshapen, half-shapen, parodied, borrowed, altered and abused
forms used by the prophets and the satirists embody the
formless, anarchic, moral dysentery each chastises and exposes"
(54). Of course, given this shared mission, prophecy and satire
encounter severe resistance, whether the overt hostility leveled
at a prophet like Jeremiah or a satirist like Pope, from within
their immediate historical circumstances. This concern for the
historical would seem to conflict with the most common
definition of prophecy as prediction, and Jemielity's deconstruction of this claim for prophecy (for example, as reproduced in
Dr. Johnson's dictionary definition) clearly establishes that
prognostication is a poor definition of what Hebrew prophets
undertake in their mission. Actually, prophecy, like satire, is
primarily concerned with the historical present and only
secondarily concerned with an imaginary future.
The rhetorical trope least common to prophecy and satire,
irony, is explored in chapter 3. Certainly, prophecy and satire
share a tendency to shock and outrage by deploying an earthy
language of the sexual and excremental. This observation
positions eighteenth-century satire in a rhetorical tradition that
extends from Hosea, Ezekiel, Jeremiah through Juvenal and
Horace to Swift and Pope. As Jemielity argues, "Nowhere do
satire and prophecy prove more outrageously shocking and
more outrageously funny than in their use of the ordinarily
tabooed subjects of sex and excretion, whose use as images can
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prove wondrously effective medicine for shocking satiric and
prophetic victims into a healthier, albeit diminished view of
themselves" (98). Of Frye's three categories of irony, only the
third, that of life as '"unrelieved bondage'" (110), demonstrates
extensive conjunction, since this phase of irony was "a necessary
mode in the faith of Israel" (111).
The second part of the book (chapters 4-5) turns to "The
Messenger" and the verbal wars in which prophets and satirists
engage. For those familiar with Dryden or Pope's clashes with
their contemporaries, this insight comes as no surprise, but
equally the prophets, too, from their usual positions on the
margins of culturally empowered institutions like cult and
court, conducted an on-going war with paid prophets hired to
provide messages of comfort to kings and priests. Quite often,
prophets were seen as mad, malign, and subversive, and
Jemielity's analysis repeatedly connects prophetic and satiric
attacks on religious complacency across the wide gap of history:
"The prophetic text attributed to Jeremiah and to Ezekiel offers
several diatribe-like castigations of fellow prophets, in theme
and development very much like the satire of religious selfdeception in Swift and Blake" (124). This analysis does not just
explore individuals but considers concepts as well, as when the
author links the Hebraic term ruah (breath) with eighteenthcentury notions of enthusiasm. Of course, the attacks against
the Hebrew prophets are more sustained and more perilous
than those experienced by their eighteenthrcentury counterparts.
After all, when Blake is considered mad or subversive, the result
is the poet's cultural marginalization, leaving him without an
audience; when Jeremiah is accused of madness and treason, he
is brought before the king for imprisonment and possible
execution.
The concluding chapter addresses the voice in which
prophets and satirist speak and write: "The prophet and the
satirist are 'voices within a text.' Prophecy is the word, the
dabar, of Yahweh. Satire, as Horace knew, is the sermo. Both
are the word" (149). Such utterances carry within them a
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compulsion to speak against cultural dissolution, where the
motivation is one of frustration and moral outrage. Although
Blake's Marriage is not cited, one thinks of that section where
Ezekiel and Isaiah suggest that the voice of God is the voice of
honest indignation. Equally, the speakers through their call to
utterance, whether prophets or satirists, become exemplars,
functioning as lightning rods for cultural authorities: "Since the
customary is often the enemy of prophet and satirist, iconoclasm is each critic's fate and danger" (157). Lurking within the
ethical stance established by prophecy and satire is a sense of
something beyond the condemnation, an "ideal" state of things
that both seek to reveal and revive. Thus, both offer a twopronged method by offering "a layer of attack and a layer of
'ideal norm'" (163), where attack becomes exhortation to aspire
to this higher ideal. This higher ideal is quite often constructed
within or out of prior articulations through which both
prophet and satirist can insulate themselves from attack and
justify their stances against current positions of authority.
This evoked ideal and the tradition out of which it emerges,
finally, renders both prophecy and satire salvific, since both
offer corrective under the guise of condemnation. "Prophecy,
thus, claims to be one of the healing arts, like satire, a moral
potion, however disagreeable to drink. The promised healing
assuages fear of the technique" (181). So, too, Jemielity's text
can equally function as corrective, since its exploration of the
considerable confluence between methods of prophetic and
satiric utterance allows eighteenth-century scholars to re
examine their sense of satire's origins and allows biblical
scholars to broaden their sense of prophecy's legacy.

w
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Carl Hill, The Soul of Wit Joke Theory from Grimm
to Freud (Lincoln and London: University of
Nebraska Press, 1993). Pp. 244. $35.00.
Reviewed by Franklin E. Liehenow, Jr.
Chicago State University
Carl Hill's subtitle suggests that The Soul of Wit is a study of
theories about jokes from Grimm until the appearance of
Freud. Instead, Hill's book primarily offers a reading of
Freud's Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. The key
phrase in Hill's reading is "social psyche." Hill proposes that
the object of Freud's analysis, the jokes and theories with which
Freud works, constitute "a culturally and historically condi
tioned social psyche" (10). Somewhat inconsistently. Hill
describes Freud's text itself "as the analysis of a social psyche"
in which competing psychological and social forces interact (90).
Notwithstanding this slippage, the broad contours of Hill's
argument emerge.
Freud not only interprets jokes from the perspective of
certain timeless and universal psychological processes, but he
also interprets them from the perspective of certain social
phenomena, such as the erotic or aggressive purposes of jokes
and the need for audience participation for their completion.
Hill argues that Freud, in attempting to account for the social
nature of jokes, either diminishes or suppresses their political
implications. The three chapters that constitute the body of
Hill's book supply the biographical and socio-economic as well
as the political subtexts both of the jokes that Freud selects and
of Freud's commentary. In "The Economics of WitzJ Hill
claims that the principle of psychic economy, which Freud
develops to account for the pleasure of jokes, is shaped by
material and cultural "factors." In "Witz, Women, and Jews,"
he contends that Freud's apolitical analysis of jokes about

382

1650-mO

women and Jews perpetuates sexist and anti-Semitic attitudes.
In "At Witz End," he points out that Freud's distinction
between jokes and the comic is problematic and that Freud
takes an apparent pleasure in gallows humor. Hill concludes in
an epilogue that poststructuralist criticism of Freud's text has
given insufficient attention to its historical antecedents.
Integral to his reading of Jokes and Their Relation to the
Unconscious is the political history of theories about jokes and
wit from the early Enlightenment through Jin-de-siecle Vienna
that Hill advances in his initial three chapters. For him,
previous joke theories carry "traces" of political engagement
that guide his interpretation of Freud's theory. Throughout its
history, Witz, according to Hill, has been used in power
struggles, variously upholding or subverting oppressors and the
oppressed. He needlessly complicates his own historicizing of
Freud's text in two related ways: he inadequately differentiates
the meanings of the elastic term Witz, and he assembles a
history of Witztheorie from fragments of different kinds of
discourse in which Witz denotes, for instance, a mental faculty,
the quintessence of satiric poetry, or jokes.
In his introductory chapter, "Vorspiel," Hill excerpts about
twenty brief quotations from the many examples that the
Grimm brothers choose for supporting and illustrating the set
of definitions under their entry for Witz in the Deutsches
Worterhuch. By giving quotations without definitions from the
Worterbuch, Hill furnishes little of the Grimms' philology of
wit, much less any theory of jokes. Hill's treatment of these
excerpted quotations, several of which antedate the Enlighten
ment, parallels his treatment of the jokes that he takes from
Freud's text. The quotations are made to speak for themselves,
and they tell about Hill's themes. Similarly, Hill believes that
Freud sets up a "textual dynamic" between joke and joke theory
that gives readers "an opening to make their own contributions"
(94). The contributions that Hill makes include finding in the
jokes that Freud quotes, as well as in Freud's theorizing about
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them, "all the big issues" of "class, race, gender, war and peace,
Utopia and apocalypse" (228).
Hill's late twentieth-century ideology governs his selection
and evaluation, not only of Freud's interpretation of jokes, but
also of the discussions of wit and theories of jokes that
purportedly generate and constrain Freud's theorizing. Because
Hill relegates writings from the seventeenth through the
nineteenth centuries to an anticipatory status. The Soul of Wit
does not invite the attention of students and specialists
interested in German literature and concepts of wit during the
early modern era. One should not expect to find, for example,
an exposition of Jean Paul's complex theory of humor. Hill's
most appreciative readers will be scholars interested in the
challenges of integrating the claims of a version of New
Historicism into the continuing critical discourse on Jokes and
Their Relation to the Unconscious.

Marie-Helene Huet, Monstrous Imagination (Cam
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). Pp. x +
316. $19.95.
Reviewed by Joel Weinsheimer
University of Minnesota
Huet's new book is a page-turner. As compellingly as any
work without a plot, it rivets the reader's attention and sustains
interest to the very end. The topic is a natural, of course.
Defying the laws of historical relativity, monsters exercise a
universal, perennial fascination, no less on us than on the
Renaissance and Enlightenment physicians whose imaginist
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theories of generation Huet surveys in the first half of her
study. That the mother's imagination can form, and therefore
also deform, the fetus was a theory virtually impervious to
challenge before 1800. Perhaps the most famous case was that
of the "hirsute virgin"—a girl whose hairiness was attributed to
her mother's gazing during conception on an icon of John the
Baptist clothed in animal skins. In the second half of the book,
dominated by intensely interesting—one is tempted to say
"gripping"—studies of Frankenstein and Madame Tussaud, with
supporting studies on Hawthorne, Villiers de I'Isle-Adam, and
others, Huet shows that even after 1800, when it had lost all
factual credibility, the supposed tie between imaginative
representation and monstrosity enjoyed a metaphorical afterlife
that reaches to the present.
This linkage makes its appearance not just in the novel (that
"loose, baggy monster") where Huet concentrates her attention,
but also and especially in literary theory (the topic, as it were,
of her book's missing last chapter). Derrida's name, the nom du
phre, appears nowhere, though his mark is discernible every
where in Huet's Monstrous Imagination. In particular, the
reader cannot help recalling the conclusion of "Structure, Sign
and Play in the Sciences of Man," where Derrida points, Johnthe-Baptist-like, to "the as yet unnameable which is proclaiming
itself and which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is
in the offing, only under the species of the nonspecies, in the
formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity."
Difference, deviancy, monstrosity preoccupy us now perhaps
more intensely than ever.
Huet's great merit consists in the way she organizes diffuse
masses of recondite details drawn from the most diverse and
esoteric sources. Her scholarship on matters both ancient and
modern is impressive, her style is graceful and limpid, her
material of intrinsic interest. If anything at all detracts from
the reader's pleasure, it is Huet's occasional interpretive
excesses. For example, "The monster thus represented the
terror of a signifier detached from its legitimate origin, just as
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it bore no visible resemblance or relationship to the father who
conceived it" (54). Here and elsewhere is just too much
theoretical melodrama, too much of the grade B horror flick.
It is almost enough to make one yearn for the bad old days of
"positivist" criticism, when it was not the critic's ingenuity but
the interest of the material itself that was assumed to suffice—as
it certainly does here, where the subject matter continually
upstages the critic. Virtually nothing that Huet can do or say
will make monsters more interesting than they already are.
Theoretical ingenuity amounts to no more than intrusion and
distraction.
The problem of overinterpretation is compounded when,
sidestepping the question of moral monsters and limiting herself
to monstrosity by birth, Huet confines herself to gender politics
as the master signified of her story. According to the classical
theory, monsters evidence the dangerous power of the maternal
imagination by displacing (Huet prefers to say "erasing") the
father's role in conception. Then, when "fathers" of modern
science such as Camille Dareste reverse this erasure by creating
monsters artificially (without mothers) and debunking the
theory of maternal imagination, Huet reads this development
allegorically, as a pathetic tale of patriarchal oppression and
revenge: "Just as the legitimate father has been 'erased' from his
progeny by an inscription that superimposed on his likeness
that of a foreign image, the mother was now excluded from the
development of the embiyo to which she had given life. She
was banished from Dareste's laboratory, her existence no longer
necessary" (121-2).
What can explain such license.' Allegoresis, according to the
Church Fathers, is justified when the literal sense of the text is
false or absurd. Something of the same kind is the case here,
for Huet adopts the modern, liberal attitude toward physical
monsters: there aren't any. They are figments of a monstrous
imagination. Thus, when moderns read premodern descriptions
of monstrous births, which cannot be literally true, they are at
liberty—indeed compelled—to take them allegorically. Even in
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analyzing genetic explanations of monsters that would seem to
have some truth value, Huet finds deep meaning: "Independent
of all scientific context, the most intriguing aspect of these texts
on heredity is the parallel drawn between cellular systems and
political organization" (106). By fictionalizing the texts,
stripping them of their "scientific context," Huet brackets their
surface truth value and thereby discovers allegories in which,
for instance, the "hierarchical relation between cells" parallels
"the hierarchical society of the Old Regime."
I have focused unfairly on the questionable aspects of what
is an overwhelmingly excellent piece of work—learned,
sophisticated, and intensely readable. But it may be worthwhile
to suggest that Huet's study still leaves room for a less
allegorical, less modern, but perhaps more radical reading of
monsters. After all, under one's bed, in one's closet, when the
lights are out, there are things more terrifying than detached
signifiers.

Robert Wokler, Rousseau (Oxford:
University Press, 1995). Pp. 132. $7.95.

Oxford

Reviewed by Megan Conway
Louisiana State University in Shreveport
Robert Wokler's Rousseau belongs to a relatively new and
ambitious series from Oxford entitled "Past Masters," whose
goal, as stated on the back cover of the book, is to be a "series
of concise, lucid, authoritative introductions to the thought of
leading intellectual figures of the past whose ideas still influence
the way we think today." In its scope, the collection is
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reminiscent of Iwayne's "World Author Series," which has
successfully carved its own niche by providing concise, reliable
information on major and minor literary figures and their
works. Since the series stresses thinkers as opposed to
authors—among fifty-seven published titles from Aquinas to
Wycliff we find The Buddha, Jesus, and Muhammad—it is not
surprising that the chapter headings are according to area of
thought rather than by work, as in the Twayne series.
While this format is certainly justified in the volume on
Jesus, it is perhaps less successful in the case of Rousseau. If the
series is intended for student use (as the excellent price would
indicate), few students are familiar enough with Rousseau's
works to determine that a discussion of the first Discourse will
be found in the chapter on "Culture, Music, and Corruption."
Certainly, the index will provide students a series of page
numbers to aid them in their search for the major works, but
such an arrangement threatens to fragment what is, in truth, a
wonderfully cogent explication of a difficult and problematic
work. Since the chapters often refer to several works and
sometimes overlap in time periods, I am disappointed that the
series includes no chronology for handy reference. To be sure,
Oxford desires to emphasize its difference from Twayne, but
those differences should not be at the expense of the reader.
Aside from these minor disappointments, Wokler certainly
fulfills Oxford's stated purpose. He outlines Rousseau's
immense contributions in the fields of intellectual history,
music theory, political thought, education, literature, and
religion but does so in such a way that the separate works are
all woven into a vast, coherent tapestry rather than presented
as individual threads of information. The works are discussed
in a more-or-less chronological order, though Wokler constantly
refers to previous and later pieces to show the unity and
evolution of Rousseau's thought. Chapter 2 describes the
foundation for his later works laid by Rousseau's two initial
bombshells that launched both his career and great contro
versy—the first Discourse and the inflammatory Letter on French
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Music. Wokler argues that music could not possibly be exempt
from Rousseau's views of the corrupting effects of civilization,
since, as propounded in the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences,
"the corruption of human morality was most clearly manifested,
according to Rousseau, in the history of the development of
music" (29). As Wokler indicates, music is tied to our first
languages, whose evolution parallels the degradation of society,
a theory that Rousseau was to pursue further in his Essay on the
Origin of Languages and in the last chapter of "The Relation of
Languages to Government."
In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, Wokler presents Rousseau's major
works—the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, the Social
Contract, and Emile—z^zin placing them in an historical and
philosophical context. The second Discourse is shown as an
answer to, rejection, correction, or even partial corroboration
of the ideas of other writers, such as Hobbes, Pufendorf, Locke
and Buffon. Moreover, Wokler suggests Rousseau's influence
on early anthropology and on Engels, Marx, and Hegel. The
Social Contract "seems to pursue the central theme of the
Discourse on Inequality in reverse" (56); instead of pointing out
the corruption of society, here Rousseau will offer a plan by
which citizens can regain their lost liberty. Again, Wokler aids
the reader by describing both Rousseau's debts and his
influence, particularly the enthusiasm that the Social Contract
inspired among France's revolutionaries. Yet, when the Social
Contract first appeared, it was not its political content that
caused an outcry, but Rousseau's views on a civil, non-Christian
religion, views repeated in Emile, which was published at the
same time. Wokler gives an effective resume of Rousseau's
theories of education, morality, and sexual roles based on Emile,
Letters from the Mountain, the New Heloise, and the Letter to
D'Alembert.
The last chapter, "Vagabond Reverie," ties up loose ends
and comments on Rousseau's later works, principally the
Confessions and the Reveries, placing them in perspective with
the rest of the author's works. In this chapter, the reader gets
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an idea of the tensions that had been building for years between
Rousseau and his contemporaries and how Rousseau's
persecution complex shaped the Confessions and the Dialogues.
His last work, the Reveries, tranquilly depicts his estrangement
from society and, while discussing it, Wokler skillfully
manipulates the reader into seeing what he does not state
outright—that Rousseau's ultimate belief in the innate, original
goodness of man shows as clearly in his last work as it did in
his first.
It is unfortunate that "Wbkler's masterful synthesis of
Rousseau's work is undermined by an opening chapter whose
omissions must startle even the most casual student of
Rousseau. Although disciples and detractors have taken sides
for and against Rousseau since the first appearance of the
Discourse on the Arts and Science, it seems only fair to expect an
objective account of the philosopher's life in a reference book
such as this. But Wokler has chosen to leave out critical
information concerning Rousseau's background, thereby
rendering the controversial and eccentric Citizen of Geneva a
bland, white-washed figure. A student with no prior knowledge
of Rousseau might well assume that the motherless Rousseau
grew up idyllically in the company of his "well-read" father
"who inspired him with a love of Nature and books" and
"encouraged his own fascination with literature, in a cultivated
manner" (2).
At fifteen, Wokler tells us, Rousseau was
"introduced to Madame de Warens who lived at Annecy in the
Duchy of Savoy, just west of Geneva" (3).
From this
biographical sketch of Rousseau's early life, the reader could
easily infer that Jean-Jacques lived a relatively normal,
middle-class childhood surrounded by books and comfort and
that, as a young man entering society, he was presented to
Madame de Warens.
This is a potentially critical misconception, for it leaves out
vital factors that influenced Rousseau's work. For example,
although Wokler uses the adjective "irascible" to describe the
father, nothing is mentioned of what amounts to the senior
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Rousseau's psychological abuse of Jean-Jacques, whom his father
accused of "causing" the death of his mother from a post-childbirth fever. Nor does Wokler indicate that, at the age of ten,
Rousseau was abandoned to the care of country pastor for two
(albeit happy) years, when his father was exiled as the result of
a quarrel. After Jean-Jacques returned to Geneva, he was
unhappily apprenticed to an engraver, whom he described as
cruel and brutal. Of course Rousseau was, at the time, no
angel, either. Certainly, he was rebellious and lazy, and one
Sunday afternoon in 1728, when the wandering apprentice
returned late .from a walk and found Geneva's city gates firmly
shut, instead of facing the wrath of his master, he ran away.
When Madame de Warens welcomed him in Annecy, no doubt
the errant and penniless boy was delighted to become Catholic
in order to obtain food and shelter. No account is made of
Rousseau's troubled relations with Madame de Warens. Therese
Levasseur, the woman with whom Rousseau lived half his life,
is referred to as "far less well educated" (3) than Madame de
Warens, but Wokler omits the fact that she was a servant girl
in an inn and very likely illiterate. Although these and other
facts are perhaps not essential to an understanding of Rousseau's
thought and philosophy, the potential for misinterpreting
Rousseau's life is problematic.
Leaving aside Rousseau's life and concentrating on Wokler's
presentation of the philosopher's works, this book is a valuable
tool for scholars as well as students. Few of us have the time
or inclination to read all of Rousseau's writings. Wokler makes
it possible for the reader to bring to the book whatever
knowledge of Rousseau's philosophy she or he possesses and see
just how that piece fits into Rousseau's entire scheme. For
readers with no familiarity of Rousseau, Wokler makes the
eighteenth-century thinker's widespread influence quite clear.
Wokler details, with striking clarity, the evolution of
Rousseau's thought, his relationships with his contemporaries,
and the ideas of those philosophers and political theorists from
whom he borrowed as well as the ideas of others whom he
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influenced. For a concise reading of Rousseau's entire corpus,
the reader would be hard-pressed to find a better source. For
a good biography, go elsewhere.

w
Joel Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics and
Literary Theory (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1991). Pp. vii + 173. $21.00
Reviewed by Ellen Breerwood Chauvin
Nicholls State University
For those of us withering in the intellectual desert of
postmodernism, choked by the Saussurean sands of signs that
do not signify, Joel Weinsheimer's latest book reveals a
philosophical oasis. Of course, those who run in hermeneutic
circles already know that the desert is merely a dune within this
all-encompassing oasis, but every traveler, whether worldly or
world-weary, will no doubt discover that the water of meaning
here is sweet and that the terrain is indeed expansive.
Initially tracing the origin of hermeneutics to its roots in
classical philology and biblical exegesis, Weinsheimer begins his
excursion into "understanding understanding" with a survey of
modern hermeneutics from Schleiermacher—its eighteenthcentury progenitor who first sought to reconstruct and
methodize understanding for correct interpretation—to Ricoeur
—its twentieth-century explorer who seeks an "instrument of
thought for apprehending...the conversion of system [language]
into event [speaking]." The overview allows Weinsheimer to
illuminate the protean nature of hermeneutics as he charts its
various manifestations in history, especially as these have been
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shaped by philosophical developments in philology, epistemology, ontology, phenomenology, archaelogy, and teleology.
Central for this book is the work of Gadamer, which provides
support for Weinsheimer's contention that philosophical
hermeneutics and literary interpretation are inextricably
linked—and both, Weinsheimer demonstrates in his final
chapter, are indispensable to analytical and pedagogical progress.
The last chapter, in fact, evinces the sheer efficacy of
hermeneutic reasoning, for in addressing the questions of the
classic versus the canon and Scripture versus Text, Weinsheimer
actually returns to the very dawn of hermeneutics itself. In
tracing the lines of force in the conflict between "catholic
democratic" pantextualists such as Scholes and "Catholic
royalist" formalists such as Eliot, Weinsheimer explores the
many subtle philosophical distinctions that arise (but arfe seldom
examined) in polemical debates about the canon. For instance,
can we say that the canon of literature is canonical in the same
sense as the Biblical Canon.' Is this really the position of
formalist critics? Do poststructural critics caricature the
formalists' position by pretending to treat the canon as if it
were the Canon? What (or whose) purposes are served by
refusing to distinguish "the meanest graffito" from the sacred?
Another outstanding point on Weinsheimer's circumference
includes the question implicitly posed in chapter 2: which came
first—the theoria or the praxis} Weinsheimer responds indirectly
by drawing upon Cadamer's critique of hubristic attempts to
foi^e an omniscient, omnicompetent Method.
Making
reference to Nietzche's governing concept—"the will to
power"—which itself radically undermines the Enlightenment
project of universal objective knowledge, Cadamer and
Weinsheimer go beyond Nietsche to show that this elemental
force of self-aggrandizement likewise finds its limits in external
reality. One limiting factor on any project advancing objective
knowledge or subjective power is the determinative force of
prejudice, especially as it channels the subject's consciousness in
ways he may never realize. Again, Weinsheimer's final chapter
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illuminates and addresses the issues raised here. Weinsheimer
poses the following provocative challenge to those self-styled
academic reformers whose attention to the political motivations
of formalist critics and classical authors has granted them so
much cachet in recent years: "Every orthodoxy must repress
the questions that threaten it, and the new orthodoxy of
suspicion must silence the classic. For if truth is in every case
the deluded expression of power, the question of the classic is
whether power, for just that reason, is the unwitting accomplice
of truth" (157).
Scholars of the Enlightenment are likely to find Weinsheimer
most intriguing when he follows Gadamer in taking Kant's
notion of aesthetic judgment as a model of historical conscious
ness—a model rich in significance for all areas of interpretation.
Because, like the individual object of art, the particular
historical event is important for its particularity and finally
resists all efforts at subsumption under a mechanistic Newto
nian rule or abstraction, any proposed Method must fall short
of success. In place of Method, Gadamer adopts Kant's concept
of taste as a determinative principle in historical consciousness.
As Weinsheimer explains, "aesthetics offers a promising way of
thinking about historical understanding because both aesthetics
and historiography address themselves to the particular, the
concrete phenomenon" (43).
Weinsheimer also seconds Gadamer's critique of Kant—
mainly Kant's refusal to grant truth value to particular objects
judged according to aesthetic consciousness.
Instead,
Weinsheimer and Gadamer insist upon the centrality of
individual exemplary particulars to the discovery of truth.
They also resist Kant's suggestion that disinterestedness is
possible, pointing out that in history there are not spectators,
only participants. Weinsheimer explains, "In principle, every
historical particular, like every genuine artwork, possesses the
capacity to challenge received universals, to enlarge the whole,
and to expand the horizon of what can be understood. The
historian who discloses the historic nature of the particular
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event by realizing its capacity to reveal a new world belongs to
the continuing history of that event...Both art and history are
modes of the unconcealment of truth: in the aesthetic Gadamer
finds a symbol of effective history" (63). And in Weinsheimer
we find a place of respite amid the polemical fury of the
academic culture war, a cooling oasis of philosophically
reflective interpretation.

w
Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the
Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics, with a
forward by Arthur C. Danto (New York: Colum
bia University Press, 1994) Pp. xiv + 200. $29.50.
Reviewed by Joel Weinsheimer
University of Minnesota
The fundamental question Martha Woodmansee addresses is
this: "how to account for the momentous shift from the
instrumentalist theory of art to the modern theory of art as an
autonomous object that is to be contemplated disinterestedly"
(32). Broadening the issues raised in her well-known article on
copyright, included here as chapter 2, she asks why it was that
utile and dulce, those time-honored criteria of aesthetic value,
came to be considered suspect and even unartistic. This shift,
Woodmansee argues, is due not to Kant's discovery of the real
nature of art, but instead to the "far-reaching changes in the
production, distribution, and consumption of reading material
that marked the later eighteenth century" (32). In surveying
Kant's precursors and successors in England and Germany,
Woodmansee finds that autonomy and disinterestedness are not
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"timeless and universal facts of aesthetic experience" (6), but
rather conceptual weapons that one side (the victorious side)
deployed to notable advantage in the culture wars of the late
Enlightenment.
In particular, the rapid expansion of the reading public that
occurred through increased literacy and the production of cheap
(often pirated) books meant that literary art was necessarily
impelled out of the exclusive patronage system and into a
market economy. Within this economy, the traditional
Horatian, reader-based aesthetic values came to justify popular
art, as opposed to the high-brow, difficult, unpopular art of the
kind produced and therefore defended by the German and
British poets and critics whose names that still today typify
high Romanticism. What the latter needed was a theory of art
and aesthetic experience that would disqualify low-brow art and
lazy, low-brow readers who wanted art to fulfill their vulgar
needs and petty purposes. Of course, these readers were, in
fact, most readers; hence the strategic usefulness of a formalist
aesthetic that made value seemingly inherent in the work itself
and autonomous from any readers whatever—while actually
legitimating high-brow readers.
By means of this forceful and persuasive argument,
Woodmansee exposes the "interests of disinterestedness." Even
readers who are convinced by it, however, may be left
wondering where this masterly argument leaves them.
Admitting (what some might dispute) that "philosophers of art,
in denial of their history, [have presented] Kant's achievement
as a hard-won triumph of pure philosophical reason" (144-5),
what would follow if these troglodytes now reinserted Kantian
aesthetics back into the marketplace and conceded its place "in
the larger debate over culture in which it originally functioned"
(7)? Briefly put, how does an idea's genesis affect its validity.'
This is no easy question, and the answer is complicated by the
fact that Woodmansee never does discuss Kant. Even if she had
analyzed the Critique of Jtidgment, however, and carefully
distinguished Kant from Schiller and Coleridge, whom she does
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consider in detail, it would remain unclear how understanding
the polemical context of the Critique affects its truth value. If
Kant in fact promotes his own or others' interests in advocating
a theory of aesthetic disinterestedness, does it follow that this
theory is suspect? Not necessarily. Kant's claim, after all, is
that the judgment of art as art is disinterested, not that aesthetic
theory is. And if we deny Kant's definition, as we well might,
would it follow from the fact that no judgment of art is
disinterested that there's no such thing as art? Or if there is
such a thing, what then does distinguish aesthetic judgments
from all other (interested) judgments? These are questions it
would take a philosopher to answer, and Woodmansee disavows
all claim to be one.
Of course, it's not just philosophers who serve particular
interests. What if it could be shown that Woodmansee's own
argument is interested? The task presents no difficulty because
she makes no attempt to hide her allegiances in the cultural
wars of the present. In her excellent final chapter, for instance,
she deplores Coleridge's "uniformitarian impulse," his search for
the one fundamental quality that would be the criterion for all
art criticism; and she celebrates by contrast "the associationists'
joyful affirmation of diversity" (136) implicit in their refusal to
transcend the empirical recipient of art. The fact that
Woodmansee has her own agenda really does not vitiate the
quality of her insights at all.
It remains the case, then, that this is a book to be reckoned
with—well worth reading and even rebutting. Woodmansee is
undoubtedly right to say that "historians of aesthetics and
criticism need to become more sensitive [to the] interplay
between legal, economic, and social questions on the one and
philosophical and aesthetic ones on the other" (47). That she
is herself more sensitive to the former questions makes her
book all the more valuable to those like myself who are more
attuned to the latter.
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Ronald Paulson, Hogarth. Volume 1: The "Modern
Moral Subject", 1697-1732', Volume 2: High Art
and Low, 1732-1750', Volume 3: Art and Politics,
1750-1764 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press; Cambridge Lutterworth Press, 1991-1993).
$24.95 per volume.
Reviewed by Peter Wagner
Universit'dt Koblenz-Landau
With Hogarth, Ronald Paulson offers us the revised version
of Hogarth's "life, art, and times" (the subtitle of the first
edition, published in 1971) as a result of what he terms a
"rethinking" of Hogarth. Lai^ely augmented, this biography
cum study aims to "establish—within the coordinates of time
and place, character and society—the man and his works (and
the man in his works) and to sort out...what Hogarth thought
he was doing from what he was so immersed in his times or in
his own unconscious as to not know he was doing" (l:xviii)—a
mighty task indeed. If the ambitious venture fails tragically, as
I think it does, it is paradoxically because Hogarth really
delivers what Paulson promises, by remaining "on the side of
the battling ego who shapes...discourses to his own end" (ibid.).
Unlike Paulson, I do not believe that a biographer must remain
on that side, and, like some previous reviewers, I see the kind
of shaping Paulson perceives, not as Hogarth's genial work but,
rather, as Paulson's idiosyncratic reconstruction. The constric
tions and pitfalls of the genre in which Paulson writes prove,
once again, that biography, brilliantly written though it may be
in this case, is the (post)modern form of hagiography. It is a
discursive form of veneration that depends on the concept of
the almighty author (the substitute for the medieval saint and
the Romantic genius) who, reconstructed by the hagiographer.
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is the ultimate authority when it comes to making sense with
his works.
Before discussing this issue, however, let me comment on the
technical aspect of the three volumes that, unfortunately, show
many signs of shoddy editing. In view of the reverence for
editorial precision that Professor Paulson acknowledges in
volume 1 (xviii), one could have expected fewer errors and
misprints. Although the quality of the reproductions of
Hogarth's works is generally good, a great number of illustra
tions are reproduced in such a small size that one has great
difficulties reading lettering and details (for example, volume 1:
figs. 16, 25, 26, 35, 74; volume 2: 41-5; volume 3: 14-18, and
passim). The numbering of the illustrations in volume 3 is
incorrect between figures 57 and 65: surely, the editors should
have noticed such howlers. And the appended notes in volume
2 (450) make one wonder about the use of modern computer
technology at Rutgers University Press.
The number of misprints and errors, still relatively small in
volume 1, increases considerably in 2 and 3. Lichtenberg's
Ausfiihrliche Erkldrung is consistently misspelled (without 'h')
throughout the three books. The errors in 2 and 3 include the
title of Nancy Armstrong's monograph (2: xvii: Dramatic
instead of Domestic), the spelling of James McArdell as
McCardell (2: 169; correct again in the index of 3); an
incorrect date (2: 427n3); misspellings of German names/words
(1: 223: "Charlottenberg"; 2: 404n83: "Jurgen"; 407n28:
"Werk"); the words "ballad" and "bootblack" (2: 318; 440n52);
"Barnell" for "Barrell," and John Camden Rotten as "Hooten"
(3: 451n33; 513n20). There is a reference to Rouquet's Tableau
in 2:450n35, but the French source is listed in neither this nor
the other volumes. The index in each volume is unreliable as
to authors and critics discussed and again contains misspellings
(for example, 3:452: "Bertelsen"); missing entries include,
among others, Acteon and Werner Busch in volume 2; and
references to Thompson (412 nil and 440), and Wagner,
discussed (460-1) in volume 3. A reviewer of volume 1
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complained about the many irritating repetitions (partly a
consequence of the insertion of material Paulson has published
over the last twenty years: see James Stevens Curl's critique in
Literary Review, July 1992, 19-20); such repetitions also occur
in volumes 2 and 3 (for example, 2:209, 360, 374). While
adapting the new sections culled from his own publications,
Paulson has not cared to update references: in 2:412nll and
440n49-50, for instance, the new edition of E. P. Thompson's
major work should have been mentioned; and in 3:445, the
recent critical editions of Smollett's novels (for example, by
Paul-Gabriel Bouce) are not listed. Downright mistakes include
3:23 (the fishwives in Beer Street do not read the king's speech),
and 3:351-61 (the role of Hogarth in the Sign Painters'
Exhibition in 1762: see the article by B. Krysmanski in the
volume of essays ed. by F. Ogee for the University of Delaware
Press, 1995).
Professor Paulson makes no mention of the important work
of some Anglo-American Hogarthians, for example, David
Bindman {Hogarth, 1981) and Mary Klinger-Lindberg (articles
on Hogarth and the theater), nor does he seem to care very
much about foreign languages and critical literature not written
in English. In l:364n30, a quotation from Roger de Piles
appears without "sic" (it should be: joue son role)-, and in 2:64,
a work by Picart appears with a faulty title {religieuses). This
becomes a great problem when French, for instance, is used in
Hogarth's writings or prints: the garbled French in plate 3 of
Marriage A-la-mode (in the quack's book) remains uncommented
upon. Critical studies by H. J. Schnackertz and W. Kemp (on
narratology in Hogarth) as well as publications by the German
art historian Werner Busch (on iconographic aspects) are not
mentioned. On the few occasions when Paulson deigns to refer
to the work of continental European scholars, he does so in a
condescending manner (for example, 2:407n28; 3: 461n66).
Nothing useful on Hogarth seems to have come from France or
Italy.
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These merely technical problems disturb the appreciation of
what Paulson has to say on Hogarth, at least for those who
accept his approach. As far as it goes, this critical commentary
is the best that is available on Hogarth at the moment, and it
is precisely because Paulson is such a thoughtful reader of
Hogarthian images that I find it regrettable to have to part
company with him on what might be termed the ekphrasis of
Hogarth's art. Paulson has been taken to task by several
reviewers of Hogarth. Thus, Graham Reynolds (who refers to
Lichtenbeig as "Lichtenstein") is reluctant to accept Paulson's
determination "to read a reference to the Choice of Hercules
into every threesome in Hogarth" in what Reynolds sees as a
late twentieth-century attempt to rescue Hogarth from the
moral reading of the Reverend Trusler (see the Times Literary
Supplement, 5 February 1993, 18, and 24 December 1993, 16).
John Barrell criticizes Paulson's overreading of nubile
Hogarthian women as versions of the "multi-breasted Diana of
Ephesus"; Barrell finds it difficult "to grasp the rules of
evidence that apply to Paulson's writing" {London Review of
Books, 7 April 1994, 18). Richard Dorment waged a hostile war
with Paulson, partly conducted ad hominem, in The New York
Review (summer and autumn 1993): for me, their bitter battle
over Hogarthian "intention" was hilarious precisely because it
is superfluous. Although I, too, disagree with Paulson's view
of Hogarth, I think he deserves more and better credit for the
remarkable, if controversial, work he has done. Paulson's
reading of Hogarth's art is almost always firmly grounded in
social and/or ideological (cultural) contexts. Unlike Barrell and
Reynolds, I find Paulson's approach, as far as this aspect is
concerned, penetrating and full of new insights. But the
problem is that he cannot go far enough on the reception side
of his critical business because, at some point along the
ekphrastic way, the author (intention) blocks his way. In
volume 2 (387n5) Paulson asserts that he has "found Foucault
and his followers endlessly stimulating, more in the terminology
of discourse than of imprisonment, but in need of subordina-
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tion to relentlessly historical facts." He does not specify which
of Foucault's works he means (and who are Foucault's
"followers";^) and, then, tellingly, discusses Althusser as seen by
Eagleton (rather than as seen by Paulson). Although he does
admit that Hogarth is, in some degree, an "historically
constructed subject," he believes that "Hogarth's subject itself
is ideology...He is constantly commenting on the general or
dominant ideologies of his time, or what he took them to be,
and showing how they warp the lives of characters—if not of
himself" (2:xvii).
The crux lies in the final, semantically ambiguous, clause,
which can be read either as exclusive or inclusive. The three
volumes suggest an exclusive meaning, as Paulson speculates for
pages on end what Hogarth may have intended, revealing,
ultimately, not so much Hogarth's intention as Paulson's
erudition. It could be aigued that Paulson might have achieved
the same result without such risky speculations on Hogarth's
aims. For who can tell us what Hogarth really intended.^ (For
a different Hogarth, "written," as it were, by the cultural
discourses of his day and age, see John Solkin, Painting for
Money, 1993, a view rejected by Paulson in his review of the
monograph: London Review of Books, 4 November 1993:
42-3). Hogarth is dead, and even his own written words are
unreliable, as Paulson admits himself; if Hogarth "expressed his
radicalism only in images, never in words" (3:32), if, in other
words, the images are ambiguous, highly ironical and contradic
tory, why, then, does Paulson limit their potential indetermi
nacy through a recourse to author intention, that chimera of
hermeneutic criticism?—Because he wants to "make meaning"
within the confines of the traditional hermeneutic circle that, as
Nietzsche once remarked, first hides meaning somewhere in the
bushes (that is, the work of art) and then triumphantly goes in
search of it.
I take Paulson's reading of Hogarthian images to be
erroneous on two accounts, despite his impressive situating of
the works in an extraordinarily detailed cultural context of

402

1650-1830

London life (which constitutes the real value of the three
volumes): firstly, Paulson's reading sells us a critic's sophisti
cated view as authorial intention, and secondly, as a conse
quence, it relegates to a secondary semantic level all the other
voices in a given picture in order to favor the allegedly 'central'
voice of that master manipulator of discourses, William
Hogarth. Ironically, Paulson proves that Foucault was right, in
1969, when he attacked such procedures (in the essay, "Qu'estce qu'un auteur.'") because they "make sense" at a high cost:
they silence or suppress those voices that may contradict the
author's, proving him to be one among many others of equal
importance.
Making Hogarth's ostensible intention (that is, Paulson's
critical opinion) the ultimate decisive point in his reading,
Paulson obviously champions the idea of a genius, an artist who
stood both above and outside the mentalities of his age: thus,
for instance, the Paulsonian Hogarth was neither Puritanical
nor anti-Semitic; he was always against the high and mighty,
and on the side of the Nobodies. Instead of being "written" by
his age in the Foucauldian sense (which is not as limiting as
Paulson would have it), Paulson's Hogarth is a (post)modern
revenant of the nineteenth-century genius and, ultimately, of
the saint in hagiography. Paulson would have done his own
critical work—and Hogarth—a better service, had he considered
theory after the New Criticism, theory (originating in France)
concerned with reading images and ekphrasis. Derrida's
concept of "differance," for instance, would have been ideally
suited for Paulson's enterprise, as he tries to place the
Hogarthian word-image constructs in an intertextual network
of codes from various fields. Another example that comes to
mind is the more traditional work of Gerard Genette on the
"paratexte," the functions of all the rhetoric that comes before
or after the main part of a work of art (in the case of Hogarth's
work: titles; accompanying texts; quotations in the frame;
words in the images). But Paulson will have no truck with
poststructuralist models of reading images that endanger his
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notion of a Hogarth in control of any kind of verbal or visual
discourse: Foucault is "adapted," Althusser rejected, and
Derrida totally ignored. So are the scholars in America who
have drawn on these French pioneers, notably W. J. T. Mitchell
and Norman Bryson. Instead, Paulson champions an ekphrastic
and heuristic model that yokes intentionalism to culturalmaterialist criticism. He thus fashions for us a Hogarth (the
man from below who strikes it rich but always remains
conscious of his lowly origins) who is the nonpareil judge of the
sense we make with his images.
Hogarth's work, it seems to me, must be defended against a
reading that creates hierarchies of meaning by selling us the
critic's opinion as authorial intention. In this sense, Mark
Roskill (see The Interpretation of Pictures, 1989, 13-16) has
shown how Paulson repeats earlier ekphrastic models (see also
my essay on ekphrasis in volume 2 of this journal). Paulson's
Hogarth lacks the inverted commas that indicate that (as in
Mieke Bal's penetrating Reading "Rembrandt" [Cambridge,
1991]) it is critical discourse that necessarily (re)creates artists
and their intentions. In the final analysis, Paulson's Hogarth
tells us much about the critic's frame of mind. What we really
need, however, is a reading of Hogarth's art without Paulson's
intentional fallacy.

Rhodri Windsor Liscombe, Altogether American:
Robert Mills, Architect and Engineer, 1781-1855
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Pp.
372. $45.00.
Reviewed hy Fermand Garlington, II
University of Houston
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Robert Mills, often considered the first native-born
professionally trained architect in America, pioneered a
distinctly American architectural style through the blending of
neoclassical and Southern Palladian designs. Trained in
architectural design by Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Henry
Latrobe, Mills designed both public and private structures. His
life's desire was to promote American idealism through the
monumentality, utility, and humanity of his constructions. The
monumentality of his monuments to George Washington is
unquestioned, as is the utility of his Treasury Building (which
introduced America to the height of neoclassical design) and
General Post Office (which made the nation realize the
brilliance of Italianate architecture). With a genuine concern
for the health and comfort of the ill of his native Charleston,
Mills designed such structures as the Charleston Marine
Hospital, combining ably the utilitarian with the aesthetically
pleasing and psychologically soothing. He also employed
similar techniques in his prison designs, for Mills believed that
such institutions were not only for retribution and punishment,
but for rehabilitation and reform as well.
Fireproofing and acoustical design also reflect Robert Mills's
pioneering spirit.
His Fireproof Building (Charleston)
demonstrated his commitment to the construction of facilities
capable of surviving the blazes then so destructive to wooden
structures. Mills was also concerned with improving the
acoustical qualities of churches and courthouses throughout
America, as is evident in his efforts to improve the acoustics of
the Old House of Representatives.
Structural acoustics and fireproofing numerous public
facilities were, of course, not the only concerns of Robert Mills.
Perhaps because of the influence of Jefferson, Mills was, though
a Southerner, opposed to slavery. Toward the latter portion of
his life, a period when sectional controversy would eventually
lead to civil war, he sought to unify the nation through his
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architecture, an architecture promoting the strength of a united
America.
Rhodri Windsor Liscombe illustrates brilliantly each stage
and concern of Mills's life and career in this superbly written,
well-researched book. As the author of The Church Architecture
of Robert Mills (1985) and Robert Mills's Courthouses and Jails
(1982), Liscombe's knowledge of Mills's work is impressive.
Divided into six chronologically significant periods of Mills's
biographical and architectural development, the text vividly
recounts both the triumphs and the frustrations of the architect.
Of especial interest are the discussions of Mills's appointment
as Architect of the Public Buildings in 1836, and his subsequent
dismissal from that position six years later. Liscombe also
provides the reader with rich details of Mills's architectural
designs. Altogether American is thus an altogether fine
contribution to the study of American architecture.

Lawrence E. Klein, Shafieshury and the Culture of
Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in
Early Eighteenth-Century England (Cambrid^:
Cambridge University Press, 1994). Pp. xiii + 217.
$49.95.
Reviewed by D. N. DeLuna
The Johns Hopkins University
The writings of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third earl of
Shaftesbury—his Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions,
Times (1711) in particular—have frequently been mined for ideas
in such diverse areas of inquiry as ethics, aesthetics, and
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religious heterodoxy. Consequently, Shaftesbury has been
considered a "major minor" figure in eighteenth-century British
intellectual history. Lawrence Klein locates a recurrent and
unifying focus of concern in his ceuvre and makes a case for his
undisputed major status as a philosophical writer and thinker of
his age. Shaftesbury was, Klein declares, Britain's premier
"philosopher of politeness" (2).
Introductory pages of Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness
stress the importance of politeness as a "new cultural paradigm"
(10). In a post-revolutionary era in which norms of conduct
were guided less and less by Church and Court, the polite ideal
"of decorous, gentlemanly sociability" (8) emerged, according to
Klein, as the dominant model and standard for organizing social
life—emerging also when a new Town landscape of coffeehouses
and a deregulated press were producing nightmares of
"unsuperrised association and rampant conversability" (11).
Thus, Klein aims to provide a window to the age as he points
up the coherence and historical significance of Shaftesbury's
corpus of writing.
His book is in two parts. Part One traces Shaftesbury's
maturation as an innovative philosopher who claimed
ontological grounding for polite human relations and eventually
developed polite modes of doing philosophy, modes that, in
Klein's view, represented an effort to induce as well as theorize
about moral philosophy's goal of self-knowledge. Shaftesbury's
project of philosophizing on politeness, on continuous display
in his writings, is early on bound up with his persistent belief
that the human condition is always already mediated by
virtuous social affections that are in keeping with God's design
of a goodly universe of cooperative parts and groupings. True
politeness, philosophically defined by Shaftesbury, refers to a
virtuous condition of striking a proper balance between
autonomy and relatedness.
But, as Klein goes on to argue, Shaftesbury came to have
doubts and anxieties about this theory of polite existence as
abstractly articulated in these early works, for his notebooks
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record his struggle to register its truth in an existential way.
And this he accomplished, according to Klein, through
dialectical criticism, by which he would measure the value of
the sociable life by the standard of autonomy and vice versa,
finally recognizing the value of a synthetic "higher politeness"
(78) that steered a middle course between the extremes of
isolation and hypertrophied, or merely theatrical, sociability.
The notebooks are also said to exhibit a new literary style of
doing philosophy, which Shaftesbury felt might be used to
communicate his polite philosophy to others with transform
ative effect: self-dialogue that mirrored the dialectical process
and was modeled after the activity of gentlemen conversing
with one another easily and on a level.
A concluding chapter of Part One concentrates on how this
style is taken up in the Characteristicks, a work that is, we hear,
an anti-monologic essay collection in which the reprinted
Inquiry is ironically framed. The piece in the Characteristicks
said to command prestige of place is the reprinted "Moralists,"
which, in addition to being written in dialogue and being
"highly dialogic" (116), contains the character of Palemon, who
is described in the work as a gentleman inhabiting both the
fashionable and learned worlds, "the only well-bred Man who
wou'd have taken the Fancy to talk Philosophy in...a Circle of
good Company...in the Park" {Characteristicks
Robertson
ed., 11:179). As Klein sees it, "Palemon in the Park" is
something of an icon, figuring forth Shaftesbury's project of
joining philosophy to polite exchange (34-36, 115-16).
In today's academic context, the terms "dialogue" and
"conversation," along with the idea of opening philosophy to
dialogic forms, are likely to conjure images of populistic
inclusiveness. But the scene of Palemon's philosophical
conversation, in "a Circle of good Company" "in the Park" is,
Klein stresses, a reliable indicator of Shaftesbury's intention of
relocating philosophy into a sociable environment inhabited
only by an exclusive group of male aristocrats and other
gentlemen at the upper reaches of the social scale. Character-
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isticks, first published in a handsome folio edition and
containing innumerable instances in which Shaftesbury utilizes
classical learning as an intellectual resource and source of
rhetorical counters, was clearly intended to reach this audience.
Part Two elucidates how Shaftesbury in his Characteristicks
and other writings was concerned not only with making these
men wise and autonomous but also, and at the same time, with
"remaking the world in a gentlemanly image" (7). As Klein
presents it, Shaftesbury, drawing on the conceptual framework
provided by the civic humanist discourse of post-Restoration
oppositionalist politics, apparently became convinced that a
nation of socially elite men, transformed through dialectical
criticism into autonomous subjects and then grown proficient
in practicing this criticism in conversation with one another,
would galvanize great achievement in learning and the arts in
Britain. So Klein finds in Shaftesbury an early thinker on the
public sphere, and one for whom the concept meant something
quite different from Habermas's bourgeois sphere fostering
political constitutionalism: it was Britain's future ascendancy
in the sphere of high culture that depended on the formation of
a public critical sphere, and this sphere was envisioned as
comprising gentlemen of means refining one another's opinions
and tastes through verbal '^amicable Collision" ("Sensus
Communis," Characteristicks, Robertson, 1:46).
Kdein stresses that it was critical expression and enquiry,
rather than the acts of flattery and awed deference, which were
at the center of Shaftesbury's polite ideal. Indeed, a good deal
of Klein's book is given over to showing Shaftesbury to be an
exemplary practitioner of critical commentary, but on a level
beyond that of the catty debunking and sneering tone so
familiar to his modern readers. Klein demonstrates, for
example, that his polite philosophy took on the "egocentric"
philosophies of Hobbes and Locke, and that his theory of the
rewards to society at large challenged the familiar assumption
that cultural advancement was attendant on the support and
patronage provided by the institutions of Court and
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Church—and, moreover, as Klein shows, here, he was engaging
in partisan political polemic because he associated this
assumption with a Tory outlook and, in effect, tendered his
own theory as a new and specifically Whiggish cultural politics.
Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness is an original and
richly informative book. It will join the work of R. L. Brett,
A. O. Aldridge, and Stanley Grean as a classic study of
Shaftesbury. What is more, if we agree that politeness, however
variously defined by contemporaries in post-revolutionary
England, assumed the status of a compelling and widely
embraced ideal of personal conduct and social organization, it
follows, then, that Klein's Shaftesbury, conceiving of politeness
along philosophical and even visionary lines, should ensure that
the age is never again casually dismissed as quaint. We should
be grateful for this contribution to eighteenth-century studies
and intellectual history.

Greg Clingham,/izwies Boswelh The Life of Johnson.
Landmarks of World Literature (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992). Pp. xviii +
131. $34.95.
Reviewed by John J. Burke, Jr.
University of Alabama
There is no denying that the winds of change have been
sweeping through the field of literary studies, sometimes with
hurricane force. Anyone who might like to observe what
results those winds of change have brought us in the field of
Boswell studies need look no farther than Greg Clingham's
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newly published volume on Boswell's Life of Johnson for the
Cambridge University Press's Landmarks of World Literature
series. What we have here is a book that bills itself as a new
introduction to a much beloved, much admired eighteenthcentury text, a work we once celebrated as a masterpiece of
English literature, and one that we would almost certainly
expect to qualify as a landmark of world literature. And what
does Greg Clingham have to tell us about Boswell's Life of
Johnson as a landmark of world literature? Basically, that we
need not bother with it any more, except, perhaps, as an
historical curiosity (124-7).
But why shouldn't we bother with it? What can possibly
account for the de-canonization of what we once thought was
one of the eighteenth century's most superb literary texts?
According to Clingham, the problem with Boswell's Life is
precisely the success it has enjoyed as literature. It has become
an end in itself rather than a means to an end, and so is the
principal reason we have the wrong idea of Johnson. The real
Samuel Johnson, that is, Johnson as he is revealed to us in his
writings, was, as far as Clingham is concerned, "a radically
different kind of man and thinker from the one portrayed by
Boswell" (94). In Clingham's view, Boswell was not intellectu
ally up to the task he had set for himself in his biography. His
was a pedestrian mind that never could quite deal with the
competing and perhaps contradictory demands of an art that
was at once both fictional and factual. Boswell's weakness as a
biographer of Johnson becomes especially evident in those
instances when he tries to act as a critic of Johnson's published
writings. Boswell, for instance, gets Rasselas all wrong. He
does this because he manages to confuse the whole with a part,
reducing the fullness of Johnson's meaning to Nekayah's
apparent endorsement of Christian teaching at the end of the
tale (86). Such moments of blindness tip us off to the basic
problem in the Life-. Boswell's inability to see beyond himself.
Johnson was, in fact, only an excuse for Boswell to talk about
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himself. Hence, his biography of Johnson has real value only
as thinly disguised autobiography.
This is evident, according to Clingham, even in the best
moments of the Life, such as the famous dinner with John
Wilkes that took place on May 15, 1776. Much as this has been
celebrated as an instance when Boswell shows us a Johnson who
was much latter—more relaxed, more sociable, more open—
than the typical stereotypes of him as narrow-minded and illtempered, this is not the case. Boswell's real purpose, according
to Clingham, was to belittle Johnson while enlarging himself
(70). What we really see in this scene is how easily Johnson
was manipulated by the vastly more intelligent and socially
adept James Boswell (70-2).
But here it seems to me is one instance where Clingham has
clearly missed the point of Boswell's text. At end of the scene,
Boswell quite carefully and quite consciously allows Johnson to
turn the tables on himself, and on John Wilkes, too. Boswell
is not belittling Johnson; he is, rather, clearly enlarging him.
Should anyone be interested in the details of how another
scholar can come to such an opposite conclusion about the very
same incident, he or she would be welcome to consult my
essay, "Talk, Dialogue, Conversation, and Other Kinds of
Speech Acts in Boswell's Life of Johnson,^ in Kevin Cope's
Compendious Conversations ([Peter Lang, 1992], 65-79).
Clingham misreads others things, too. He makes much of
the fact that Boswell turns our eyes away from Johnson during
the death scene (106). But the truth is Boswell did not himself
witness the death scene. He was in Scotland at the time of
Johnson's death, some 400 miles away. So he had to rely on
the testimony of others for his account of Johnson's death. But
this is only part of a larger failure on Clingham's part to take
into account how much testimony from others is included in
the Life. Boswell's Johnson is not, in fact, just Boswell's
Johnson. He is, rather, a compilation of the testimony of many
others, including Frank Barber, Sir Joshua Reynolds, Bennet
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Langton, the Rev. William Adams, Edmund Burke, Dr. Richard
Brocklesby, and John Hoole, to mention only a few.
Nor is it true to say—as Clingham does—that Boswell "took
every opportunity of doing down both Mrs Thrale and
Hawkins as serious biographers of Johnson" (59). He did
object, with good reason, to the "dark, uncharitable cast" of
Hawkins's biography and to Hester Thrale Piozzi's inaccuracies,
but he never really had to say much more. Their own
biographies were the best possible cases against them. Nor,
might I add, has Donald Greene proved that Boswell fabricated
many of the sayings he attributes to Johnson, as Clingham
claims on more than one occasion (45, 124-5), and no one
knows that better than Donald Greene himself. What might be
said to be true is that Greene has succeeded in raising doubts
about the full authenticity of a few of Johnson's more
notorious quips (most notably, "The woman's a whore, and
there's an end on't"). But by no stretch of the imagination can
we say that Greene has proved that Johnson did not say these
things. And that for a very good reason. Donald Greene was
not and could not have been present at the moments when
those things are reported to have been said, so he is in no
position either to confirm or deny what was or wasn't said with
certainty, much less with absolute assurance.
But Clingham's willingness to accept as proof what clearly
is not proof is but one more instance of his disturbing eagerness
to seize on any information that is unfavorable to Boswell.
And that in itself is but a symptom of what is really wrong
with his book. According to Clingham's view of the world,
people respond to Boswell's Life either as Boswellians or as
Johnsonians (5). The Boswellians are those who are delighted
with the literary picture of Johnson they are presented with in
the Life, and think no more about it. Johnsonians, on the
other hand, are appalled by the Life because in it they see the
man they revere reduced to a mere caricature. It may well be
that there are some on the extremes who fit such character
izations, but it is far more likely that many of us, possibly most
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of us, don't fit into either camp. Yet Clingham—perhaps
because he is so clearly himself a Johnsonian—seems unable to
conceive of a world where readers might be both Boswellians
and Johnsonians, that is, fully able to appreciate what both
writers have to offer us even if it is quite different, and what is
more able to feel all the richer precisely because we live in a
world that is both/and rather than either/or.
For all the things that seem to be wrong with Clingham's socalled introduction to the Life of Johnson, there is one point on
which he and I do agree. He points his finger at the gap he
says exists between our imaginative experience with Johnson in
Boswell's biography and our reading experience of him when
we devote ourselves to his best work as a writer. I agree. That
gap does exist. I have felt it myself, so has Clingham, and so
have many others. To come upon, say, any one of several
Rambler or Idler essays, or The Life of Savage, or the Preface to
Shakespeare, or the Dictionary as a whole or in parts, or A
Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland, or even or maybe
especially Johnson's brief review of Soame Jenyns's Free Inquiry
into the Nature and Origin of Evil, is to experience a sudden
jolt. For these pieces by Johnson are far denser, far more
stimulating, and much more richly satisfying than anything we
might be led to expect after reading in Boswell's Life.
On this count, then, I agree with Clingham. The gap is
there. How to account for that gap and what to make of it are
challenging theoretical problems. But Clingham only seems to
want to find in that gap the evidence he needs for a final
condemnation of Boswell's L^^. It does not, he says, lead us
into Johnson's works; instead, "the Life has convinced readers
of the possibility of understanding Johnson fully without taking
into consideration his works" (3). But if that is so (and I am
not entirely sure that it is), the problem is with readers, not
with the Life. What is more, to ask Boswell's Life to lead
directly to Johnson's writings is to ask it to do what no other
biography has ever done or perhaps could ever do. It's like
asking the Empire State Building to be the Brooklyn Bridge.
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why should Boswell's biography—or any other biography for
that matter—be asked to do what it was never designed to do?
Or does Clingham have a quarrel with the very nature of
biography? Boswell wrote his biography for an audience that
was, by and lar^e, familiar with Johnson's published work.
There was no need to quote from pieces already familiar to the
public. Boswell included instead those items with which the
public was not likely to be familiar, a good many of his familiar
letters, excerpts from his diaries, and, of course, his own record
of Johnson's talk and conversation.
What is missing in this most recent introduction to Boswell's
Life of Johnson is a necessary sense of balance. To read
Clingham is to enter into a kind of Manichaean critical world
where light and darkness, good and evil, struggle with one
another for the soul of the reader. Boswell pulls on us from
one direction, and Johnson's writings pull on us from another.
If Boswell proves the more powerful of the forces, then
darkness has indeed swallowed up the light. But this is the stuff
of fairy tales. Clingham, I am sure, would want to classify me
as a Boswellian, but though I certainly value Boswell as a
writer, I would not want to find myself in the position of
having to defend everything that he ever said or did. As a
matter of fact, he did and said things that I do not like and, in
a few cases, he did and said things that I find positively
embarrassing. His sophomoric ode on the supposed upcoming
nuptials between Johnson and the newly widowed Mrs. Thrale
is one example that springs readily to mind. Others, I am sure,
would like to classify me as a Johnsonian because they know
that, like Clingham, I believe Johnson to be one of the greatest
writers in English literature. But much as I admire Samuel
Johnson the writer, I would certainly not want to defend
everything that he ever wrote. It may be easy enough to
defend the Johnson of the Ramblers that Clingham is so fond
of quoting, or the Johnson of Rasselas, or perhaps even Johnson
the great critic, but there is much more to Johnson than those
works, and some of it certainly proves awkward.
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There is, after all, another side to Johnson, a side that
Clingham keeps carefully out of sight. We may esteem Johnson
as a great critic, but we are also forced to admit that, though he
thought poorly of Milton's "Lycidas," somewhat strangely, he
thought very highly of Richard Savage's poetry. We may also
get uncomfortable when we remember that, much as we value
him as a critic of Shakespeare, he also made clear that he
believed Shakespeare's comedies to be far superior to his
tragedies, a notion that has not found many adherents in the
more than two hundred years that have followed the publica
tion of that opinion in his Preface to Shakespeare.
But perhaps we should turn to Johnson's Lives of the Poets.
Clingham has much to say in praise of these pieces in his book,
so I am presuming he would rather send a new generation of
readers here. But what I would like to know is, would he be
willing to send them to Johnson's Lives of Blackmore, Watts,
Pomfret, and Yalden? I ask about them rather than about the
Lives of Milton, Dryden, or Pope because these were the names
Johnson added to the list of poets he received from the
publishers. That action—which had nothing to do with
Boswell—virtually commands us to look anew at the poetry
that so won Johnson's esteem. Yet, somehow or another I
doubt that Clingham would be very excited about sending a
new generation of readers to these parts of Johnson's Lives of
the Poets. Those Lives, I more than suspect, don't really
illustrate the Johnson he has in mind. These four poets were
all noted for their public commitment to Christianity, and that
seems to have been Johnson's principal reason for trying to
bring them within the canon of English poetry. But Johnson's
own very public commitment to Christianity does not seem to
be one of Clingham's favorite topics. On more than one
occasion he speaks of Boswell's notion of Johnson as a
Christian hero with some discomfort and even with a hint of
disdain (79-80, 86-8, 97, 118). Clingham seems to believe that
Boswell put too much emphasis on Johnson's Christianity;
hence, no doubt, his distaste for Boswell's interpretation of
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Rasselas. But is it really possible to screen out Christianity and
still deal fully and honestly with Johnson's writings?
And then there is the matter of Johnson's political writings,
of which we have been hearing so much in recent times.
Perhaps Clingham would like to send a new generation of
readers to one of Johnson's political pamphlets, say, to Taxation
No Tyranny. Or, perhaps even better, to The False Alarm. In
that pamphlet, a new generation of readers can watch the writer
Clingham believes should be their hero defending the cause of
law and order in late eighteenth-century Britain. I am sure they
will be duly inspired by the logical twists and turns involved in
declaring Henry Luttrell "lawfully elected" to the British
Parliament in an election where he received 296 votes, while
John Wilkes received only 1,143. Such arithmetic would
certainly give new meaning to any idea of representative
government. Greg Clingham faults Boswell's Life of Johnson
because it does not, he says, lead its readers directly to
Johnson's writings. But, I ask, is that really such a bad thing?

w
E. P. Thompson, Witness Against the Beast: William
Blake and the Moral Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993). Published but not released;
price and final pagination to be announced.
Reviewed by Mark Houlahan
University of Waikato
Soon after first reading Witness Against the Beast, I attended
a conference where I was introduced to a visitor from England
as someone who worked on "seventeenth-century mad people."
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On that occasion I was speaking of Diggers, and have been
known to rant in public. Nevertheless, I bridled at this
dismissal both of my own endeavors and those of early modern
pamphleteers. In its small way, this offhand comment struck
me as a clear example of "the enormous condescension of
posterity" from which E. P. Thompson attempted, throughout
his writing life, to rescue "the poor stockinger, the Luddite
cropper, the 'obsolete' hand-loom weaver, the 'utopian' artisan,
and even the deluded follower of Joanna Southcott" (see
Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class, 12). He
was a pioneer, of course, in writing such histories "from
below." Moreover, he specialized in what we might call
"history from within," for his various rescue attempts are
marked by an empathy both for the socio-economic plight in
which his subjects found themselves and for the ways they
sought to understand and change that milieu. In other words,
he was a pioneer also of what, in English departments, is now
called "cultural studies" and what historians call mentalites:
"ambience...a whole vocabulary of discourse, of legitimation and
of experience" (see Thompson's Customs in Common, 2). As
the code word "discourse" suggests here, Thompson was also
profoundly interested in the texts with which his artisans and
croppers structured their world. He and Christopher Hill seem
to me still unrivalled in their ability to evoke the force of those
texts. Thompson's first book was a study of William Morris;
now, fittingly, his last returns to the literature of history and
the continuing power of the writings of William Blake, "a plank
in the floor upon which the future must walk" (228).
Blake is one of the literary heroes of the Making of the
English Working Class, where Thompson suggests that Blake's
"own beautiful vision of Jerusalem...in its modification of
attitudes and nourishment of new aspirations...was perhaps as
long-lasting in its influence as the ailments of Tom Paine"
(130). Clearly, Blake nourished Thompson's own historical
imagination for decades. Witness Against the Beast is not so
much a magisterial account of that nourishment as it is a series
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of essays exploring the sources and force of Blake's "own
beautiful vision." This vision Thompson places squarely within
the milieu of his own counter-Enlightenment heroes; one of the
book's strongest chapters is entitled "Anti-hegemony." Here,
Blake is linked with those whom Thompson has studied with
such passion, whose antipathy to the emergent capitalism in
eighteenth-century England (and the consequent failing of the
pre-capitalist moral economy) was expressed in the language of
Protestant dissent. In particular, Thompson claims Blake as an
antinomian, committed to the doctrine of free grace being
sufficient for salvation, freed thereby from the doctrines of
Works, Morality and Legality, which could be found in settled
dissenting churches as well as in Anglican parishes throughout
England. To reject these ideologies was, in Thompson's terms,
to reject also the social structures that those ideologies so
effectively propped up. The best chapter of the book, to my
mind, shows how these anti-hegemonic impulses framed the
searing cadences of Blake's "London," which Thompson finely
describes as "a literal poem and...also an apocalyptic one; or, we
may say that it is a poem whose moral realism is so searching
that it is raised to the intensity of apocalyptic vision" (187).
Thompson shows, in other words, how the rhetoric and
imagery of apocalypse illuminates the specific oppressions of
counter-revolutionary London of the early 1790s.
That combination links Blake with the apocalypticists of the
1650s, the Ranters, the Diggers, the early Quakers and, of
course, the Muggletonians. For Thompson's claim is not just
that the crisis of the 1790s called forth social critiques voiced in
the language of Christian prophecy, just as it did in the 1650s,
but that there is also a direct link between these two periods.
Throughout the long eighteenth century, those attitudes are
kept alive by being passed from one witness to the next, and
key texts from the 1650s are available in London throughout
the 1790s. In particular, Thompson tracks the pronounced
similarities between Muggletonian doctrine and Blake's socioreligious theories. His unprovable hunch is that Blake's
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mother, Catherine, may have come from a Muggletonian family
and, through "crooning...to baby William on her lap" (105),
provided the basis of Muggletonian imagery and symbolism
from which Blake's poems emerged.
The Muggletonian archive, which Thompson himself
rediscovered, proves that Blake was not a card-carrying member
of the Muggletonian church; Thompson depicts Blake not as
endorsing its literal doctrines but as deploying its imagery "as
a fund of imaginative possibilities and as intellectual footholds
for an anti-Enlightenment stance" (105). Now, Muggletonian
doctrines are puzzling and arcane (though no more so than
Blake's own prophetic books), and this specific theory must
remain as tentative as it was when Thompson gave the
Alexander lectures in Toronto in 1978, of which this book is a
much-delayed and much-expanded version. Even if one
discounts Blake's mother, one must still deal with the cogency
of Thompson's vision of Blake and of the long eighteenth
century: that "a tract of secret history, buried like the Great
Plain of Gwaelod beneath the sea" (542), links the rhetoric of
revolution from 1650 through to 1790; that Blake drank deep
of that rhetoric, acquired from familial and social sources rather
than from the arcana of scholarship, from lived reality as much
as recondite libraries, and that Blake's resulting texts are
compassionate, apocalyptic and deeply humane.
This last claim, of course, could also be made of Witness
Against the Beast. It shows just how powerful the "old"
historicism can be, and what a fine writer Thompson himself
was. Its conclusions will, I suspect, be too bold for Blakeans to
adopt holus-bolus, but Witness will still bear reading both as a
passionate contribution to Blake scholarship and as a lucid
summation of Thompson's own "good old cause."
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David M. Whalen, The Consolation of Rhetoric
John Henry Newman and the Realism of Personalist
Thought (San Francisco and London: Catholic
Scholars Press, 1994). Pp. xii + 257. Cloth: $59.95.
Papen $39.95.
Reviewed by Terry G. Harris
Louisiana State University in Shreveport
The title The Consolation of Rhetoric is perhaps not likely to
attract a wide audience of readers, but this book deserves a very
wide audience indeed. As the foreword by Ralph Mclnerny
and the preface by Dennis Quinn suggest, David Whalen's
study of John Henry Newman gives both life and contempo
rary relevance to the work of this major nineteenth-century
literary/cultural figure. Some will no doubt conclude that in
seeming to limit Newman to rhetorical analysis, the book's
focus is too narrow, but in reality the rhetorical analysis
becomes the means by which the reader can come to a greater
appreciation of all aspects of Newman's life and work. Thus,
this book will properly appeal to students with wide-ranging
interests, including literature, religious studies, linguistics, and
philosophy. It is a study of Newman, but it is also a study of
intellectual history.
Whalen opens his study with an anecdote that serves as a
springboard for the overriding assertion of his book: "New
man's thought was so profoundly rhetorical, that rhetorical
modes of reasoning dominated his thought about virtually any
subject throughout his life" (3). This statement allows Whalen
to distinguish his study of Newman's rhetoric from those who
see that rhetoric lai^ely in terms of stylistic art only, and he
continues to establish the boundaries and framework of his
analysis by surveying the various traditions in which Newman
has been read, most notably Newman as philosopher or
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Newman as theologian. While claiming that Newman is
neither an Aristotelian nor a Thomist, Whalen nevertheless
argues that to read Newman in these two traditions illuminates
the true, rhetorical nature of Newman's thought. Aristotle
serves as Newman's "keystone and touchstone of formal
reasoning" (13), and the Thomistic tradition "allows his
understanding of knowledge and truth to stand clearly in its
proper relation to being, intellect and personality" (15).
Whalen thus stakes out his territory, distinguishing his study
from critical, philosophical readings that see Newman as skeptic
(Harold Weatherby is prominently mentioned in this regard) or
Newman as phenomenologist (for example., Edward Sillem, A.
J. Boekraad, J. H. Walgrave).
Additionally, Whalen carefully distinguishes his study from
Walter Jost's relatively recent analysis, which also, in Whalen's
words, "attemptfs] a radically rhetorical synthesis of Newman's
thought" (4). But Jost, by aligning Newman with twentiethcentury "epistemic" rhetoricians such as Kenneth Burke,
Richard McKeon, George Campbell, Stanley Fish, Nicholas
Lash, Chaim Perelman, and Steven Toulmin, suspends
Newman's thought "upon the twin horns of epistemic,
moderate relativism: certainty without determinacy, truth
without demonstrability." The result is an undermining of "the
very real epistemic force of [Newman's] mind and writings" (5).
Much of the discussion of the distinctions between Whalen's
study and these others occurs later in the body of the book, but
the opening chapter splendidly establishes the book's thesis,
outlines its objectives, and places it in relation to other studies
of Newman.
The next nine chapters form three sets of three chapters
each, though nothing in the numbering or organization of the
chapters indicates such an arrangement. The first group of
three examines, in order, the goal of Newman's rhetorical
knowledge—truth, the purpose of his habit of mind—as a pastor
of souls, and the means by which he shares his thought,
knowledge, and insight—personal identification with others.
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The next group of three examines the rhetorical tradition,
beginning with the patristic and medieval eras, moving into the
Renaissance, and, finally, into the eighteenth century. The goal
of the survey is to reveal the wrong turns in the history and
thus demonstrate that "Newman's intellectual mission was
largely an attempted restoration of the highly personal modes
of rhetorical knowledge and discourse" (127). The last group of
three examines Newman's Philosophical Notebook and Grammar
of Assent to show that even in works with an admitted
philosophical component, Newman's habit of mind remains
deeply rhetorical. Throughout the study, Whalen argues that
Newman's rhetorical approach applies to everything he wrote,
but Whalen privileges the Grammar of Assent as the "single
text" in which Newman brings together "his theory and
practice of rhetorical personalism, the purposive character of his
life's work, and his vision of fallen man in quest of rectification
of mind and soul" (161).
As evidence of the order and control Whalen has over his
presentation, the concluding paragraph of each chapter provides
an excellent summary and a forecast of what is to come in the
next chapter. As the book progresses, these summaries gain
cumulative force. However, if one were to read only these
summary paragraphs, then one would miss the carefully detailed
analysis. In this study, the trip is as much fun as arriving at the
destination.
A major focus of the concluding chapter is the study of
Newman's rhetorical thought by Walter Jost. By explaining the
differences between Jost's view and his own, Whalen both
identifies Jost's deficiencies and recapitulates his own argument.
As he rounds off his discussion, Whalen brings the reader full
circle fifty years later. Whereas he opened the study with an
anecdote detailing a meeting between Newman and Dr. Thomas
Arnold, he concludes with an anecdote detailing a meeting
between Newman and the adult Matthew Arnold. In both
instances, the anecdotes allow him to emphasize the personal
level upon which Newman's rhetorical approach depends.

Book Review Comer

423

Although Whalen includes biographical details throughout
his analysis, the liveliness with which he relates the opening and
closing biographical anecdotes and the ease with which he
integrates them leave the reader wishing for more such
biographical exposition. Perhaps Whalen might want to
consider a biography as his next project. In any case, his
writing throughout is thoughtful, lucid, and, above all,
understandable. It is true that some of the terminology of
formal, classical rhetoric finds its way into the discussion, but
even readers without significant background or training in
rhetoric will be able to follow the explanations. That is indeed
refreshing in these days of studies that seem to depend upon
code language of fashionable schools of critical thought. By
focusing on rhetoric, Whalen infuses his study with a reason
ableness that underscores its believability. In short. The
Consolation of Rhetoric is now and will remain a valuable and
significant contribution both to Newman studies and to the
history of ideas.

w
David A. Hollinger and Charles Capper, eds., The
American Intellectual Tradition: A Sourcehook. 2nd
ed., 2 volumes (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993). Volume I: Pp. xv -f- 467; Volume II: pp.
xiii + 429. Cloth, $39.95 each volume. Paper,
$18.95 each volume.
Reviewed by Stephen C. Brennan
Louisiana State University in Shreveport
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In this expanded anthology for college courses in American
intellectual history, David A. Hollinger and Charles Capper
have collected more than eighty primary texts that document
the "family of disagreements" (I:vii) making up the American
intellectual tradition. The editors have organized the selections
around eight topics. Volume I, covering the period from 1630
to 1865, has five sections: "The Puritan Vision," "Republican
Enlightenment," "Evangelical Democracy," "Romanticism and
Reform," and "The Quest for Union." Volume II, covering the
period from 1865 to the present, has only three sections:
"Toward a Secular Culture," "Social Progress and the Power of
Intellect," and "To Formulate the Modern." A two- or threepage introduction, including a selective but reasonably extensive
bibliography, establishes the context for each section, and a
headnote with bibliography does the same for each author.
Appendices list year by year important American documents,
European documents, and political, social, and cultural events.
The headnotes, which seldom run much more than half a page
for even major figures such as Emerson, often seem too brief to
"highlight the dense interiority of each document as well as the
setting in which it was produced" (I:viii), but since the editors
offer the collection as a sourcebook and not a systematic
interpretation, this brevity is a minor drawback. The last
section on the modern is something of a loose bag; nevertheless,
the collection is an excellent text for courses in American
intellectual history, and it offers teachers of American literature
a fresh look at familiar works in a broader context.
Volume I of The American Intellectual Tradition contains
many works often found in literature anthologies: Winthrop's
sermon "A Modell of Christian Charity," Franklin's scheme of
moral perfection from The Autobiography, Emerson's "SelfReliance," Fuller's "The Great Lawsuit," Thoreau's "Resistance
to Civil Government." But the familiar story of Puritan fervor
declining into rational enlightenment and reemei^ing in
romanticism takes on broader implications as one reads through
the sections on "Evangelical Democracy" and "The Quest for
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Union." In the former, Charles Grandison Finney's 1835
lecture "What a Revival of Religion Is" makes for especially
interesting reading. Insisting that man's will is impotent
without grace, that God employs "the ordinary rules of cause
and effect" (1:195) in regenerating man's will, and that individu
als should not only achieve an understanding of their duty but
"put it in practice, and go to work" (l:20l), Finney seems a
transitional figure offering a rationalized Puritanism ending in
Emersonian self-reliance. Equally interesting in relation to the
political question of union is the selection from John C.
Calhoun's A Disquisition on Government from the late 1840s.
In a curious defense of individual inequality, Calhoun argues a
theory of the state as an "organism" (1:368) that can act only
with the unanimous consent of all interest groups, yet he asserts
that each interest group is sovereign and can exercise an
absolute veto power over all other groups. And so Calhoun
curiously manages to extend the romantic paradox of the
individual as part and particle of God to the defense of states'
rights and slavery.
If the story implicit in volume I is the triumph of romanti
cism, the story of volume II is largely the triumph of humanism
and pragmatism. Josiah Royce's 1898 essay "The Problem of
Job" carries forward the tradition of romantic idealism in
identifying human suffering as necessary to the "perfected" life
of the "Absolute Being" (6:68), yet it also anticipates Teddy
Roosevelt in celebrating a "strenuous" life of "triumphant
warfare" and "endless service" (11:74). William Graham Sumner
may sound the Social Darwinist's warning against breaking
natural laws by helping the weak and unfortunate, but the
dominant voices—from William James, W. E. B. DuBois, and
Meridel LeSueur to Martin Luther King, Adrienne Rich, and
Betty Friedan—speak out for the possibilities of effecting social
change and humanizing the world.
One finishes these essays with the sense that America has
failed many of its citizens—blacks, women, homosexuals—but
one also has an inspiring vision of an American that reconciles
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the one and the many. The emotional climax is Richard
Rorty's 1986 essay "Science as Solidarity." Going beyond
Thomas Kuhn in arguing the dependence of science on culture,
Rorty offers a pragmatic view of all "objective truth," scientific
and other, as "intersubjective agreement" (11:361). In Rorty's
Utopian "heyday of the fuzzy," academia would be something
of a multicultural paradise in which academic disciplines
"denote communities whose boundaries were as fluid as the
interests of their members" and whose numbers' ultimate
loyalty was to "the latter community" devoted to "the
preservation and enhancement of civilization" (11:368). If the
collection has a major drawback, it is that the concluding halfdozen selections do not reflect recent intense disagreements over
just this question of multiculturalism. Our intellectual
tradition, Mr. Hollinger and Mr. Capper inform us, is "a family
of disagreements." They would more accurately represent the
current state of the family if they were to give voice to
conflicting opinions about how to make one culture out of the
American many.

Arthur Versluis, American Transcendentalism and
Asian Religions (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993). Pp. 355. $48.00.
Lenore Thomas-Ealy
The Johns Hopkins University
Space and time, the dimensions in which we live, are
comprised of similarly paradoxical fabrics. Travel far enough
to the West, we cross the international dateline and suddenly
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find ourselves in the East. The opposite ends of time, too, can
appear to meet when examined through human history. The
paradoxical relationships between past and future, between East
and West, emerge in Arthur Versluis's comprehensive account
of the Orientalism of the American Transcendentalists.
Versluis' study steps into a void left by Edward Said's landmark
Orientalism (1978), which attended not at all to the engagement
of the Transcendentalists with Oriental religious texts and
traditions. Versluis draws upon Said both for his starting point
and for part of his interpretive framework and offers us a broad
account of the ways in which the Transcendentalists read,
assimilated, and popularized the increasing amount of informa
tion made available to them about Eastern religions.
Versluis has delved deeply into Transcendentalist literature
reaching from the 1830s to the 1880s, from Emerson and
Thoreau to Samuel Johnson and Moncure Conway. Essays,
sermons, monographs, periodicals, personal correspondence, and
newspaper accounts of Transcendentalist discussion clubs
comprise a vast body of literature. From these, Versluis has
constructed an account of Transcendentalism in which
increasing encounters with non-Judeo-Christian religions seem
to have catalyzed the movement of Protestant Christianity
through Unitarianism to its radical conclusion in a rejection of
tradition and an embrace of universal religion. Emerson and
Thoreau are shown to have assimilated Eastern religious
language sympathetically and judiciously in their construction
of a largely literary religion, finding felicitous expressions in
Asian religions of their owii emphases on moral discipline and
self-transcendence. Versluis finds in later Transcendentalism
less positive assimilation and more of a tendency to interpret
Asian religions from within a worldview governed by notions
of progress, evolution, and a millenialist-inspired expectation of
an imminent golden age of a true universal religion.
In Transcendentalist journals and writings of the second-cycle
Transcendentalists such as Lydia Maria Child and James
Freeman Clark, Versluis shows the tensions that arose when
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Transcendentalists tried to synthesize the concepts of universalism and progress. Were non-Judeo-Christian religious traditions
merely evidences of ancient primitive superstitions past which
Christianity, then Protestant Christianity, then Unitarian
Transcendentalism had progressed, or did they provide
insightful truths that would be absorbed and manifested in the
emerging universal religion.? Transcendentalist authors were
neither agreed on nor consistent in these matters, but Versluis
suggests that, for the most part, they were more positive in
their uses of Asian religions than were orthodox and evangelical
Christians, who generally denigrated foreign traditions. Versluis
helpfully compares the treatment of Asian religions in generalinterest American magazines and Transcendentalist journals and
suggests that the Transcendentalists' readings of Asian religions
marked an important step toward positive Orientalism and
religious pluralism in an increasingly heterogeneous American
culture.
The concepts of positive and negative Orientalism can be
traced back to Said, who has recently reflected in The Times
Literary Supplement (February 3, 1995, 3-6) on the fate of his
Orientalism. There, he has clarified his objections to what he
calls "Orientalism," noting that his criticism arises when the
study of "Oriental languages, societies and peoples" is expanded
into a system and "approaches a heterogeneous, dynamic and
complex human reality from an uncritically essentialist
standpoint." Such an approach, Said claims, "suggests both an
enduring Oriental reality and an opposing but no less enduring
Western essence, which observes the Orient from afar and, so
to speak, from above." Versluis adopts briefly, backs away
from, and finally adapts Said's use of "colonialism," in which
scholarship is seen as a tool of political and, especially,
imperialist expansionism. The Transcendentalist embrace of
progress implicitly endorsed the concept of Western superiority
and was supportive of manifest destiny. Nevertheless, Versluis
concludes that Transcendentalism proved more a congenial kind
of literary colonialism. The individualist tendencies of the
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Transcendentalists, even of those whose motives began to shift
from religious to social concerns, made them incapable of
establishing anything resembling a "school," and by the 1880s
there was no longer what could be even considered a coherent
Transcendentalist conversation.
If Versluis's book provides an important complement to
Said's work, it misses several opportunities to contribute even
more to our understanding of the intellectual atmosphere that
led to the American Civil War. Important studies, especially
the work of Eugene Genovese, which have begun to read
seriously antebellum Southern authors, are showing that the
Civil War disrupted an important American debate over
progress. Progress needed to be both material and moral, and
Northerners and Southerners were engaged in sometimes
radically divergent efforts to link the two with both economic
and theological arguments. Versluis points to the tensions
between mercantilism and industrialization and religion as he
explores Emerson's and Thoreau's discomfort with the ideology
of progress, but he doesn't capitalize on the opportunity to
explore more fully how readings of Asian religions contributed
to a heterodox and Northern critique of the emerging modern
economy and its perceived social and personal ills.
Versluis's short chapter on the Transcendentalist dissenters
Melville and Brownson is particularly welcome, but it again
tempts us to expand our horizons and consider Brownson's
rejection of Transcendentalist individualism and appropriation
of Eastern teachings in the broader context of contemporary
American social thought. Furthermore, Versluis's claim that
the Transcendentalists efforts were directed toward religious
pluralism suffers from an insufficient definition of pluralism.
The expectation of a universal religion and the use of Asian
religious beliefs to demonstrate the moving wheels of progress
seem less to lay the groundwork for religious pluralism than to
seek the dissolution of independent religious traditions.
Brownson's critique at least implies this point about Transcen
dentalism, but Versluis doesn't draw it out. The assertion sits
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uncomfortably in a treatment that is sufficiently literary but less
thematic and theoretical than desired by this reader.
As a whole, American Transcendentalism and Asian Religions
is a significant contribution, providing an abundance of material
to introduce students of literature and comparative religion as
well as historians and political theorists to an important aspect
of the thought of the Transcendentalists. Though this study
does not itself bridge geography and time and allow us to
interpret American Unitarianism and Transcendentalism as
outgrowths of problems stemming from the Renaissance (which
issued in the modern vision of a pluralist world) and the
Reformation (which initiated the fragmentation of Christianity),
it does set a pylon on which other scholars can begin to build
that bridge. Versluis's work reinforces Said's recent assertion
that "cultures and civilizations are so interrelated and interde
pendent as to beggar any unitary or simply delineated
description of their individuality." The Transcendentalists'
appropriation of Asian religions within what might be called a
Renaissance-Platonic vision of the ultimate unity of truth can,
perhaps, teach us a thing or two about the possibility of
pluralism without succumbing to the dangers of relativism or
dogmatism. As West and East have infused one another across
space, so our knowledge of the past and our expectations for
the future join to shape our understandings of the present time.
Versluis's study provides insights and raises questions to expand
our inquiries in both dimensions.

